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Leftist Sexual Politics and Homosexuality: A Historical Overview

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During the post-World War II years, homosexual rights groups revived or came into being for the first time across the Western world—in the United States, Holland, Germany, France, and the Scandinavian countries.¹ These 1950s organizations, often designated as “homophile” to distinguish them from post-Stonewall developments, were largely politically neutral, although their backgrounds were actually quite diverse: the American and Dutch organizations, Mattachine and COC, had originated on the left, while the French Arcadie circle sprang from the right.² Their neutrality arose from the necessity of negotiating inhospitable political terrain, for the rebuilding of Western Europe and the Cold War spawned governments that continued and even bolstered the erotophobic ethos of the immediately preceding decades.³ In Europe, gays faced a chilling atmosphere of opprobrium and ostracism. In Germany, the constitutionality of the 1935 sodomy statute promulgated by the Nazis was upheld by the highest West German court in 1957, and gay concentration camp survivors were flatly denied any restitution.⁴ In France, the pro-Nazi Vichy regime had raised the age of

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consent for homosexual relations from thirteen to twenty-one, and this law remained unchanged until 1978. In Holland just after the war, the Christian Democrats forced their Social Democratic coalition partners to fire one of their cabinet ministers because he was gay.⁵ In Britain, Guy Burgess's 1951 desertion to Moscow was used as evidence to argue that homosexuals were traitors, part of a shadowy "Homintern" (see the contribution in this volume by Fred Sommer); and Alan Turing—whose work in counterintelligence during World War II had helped England as much as Blunt had thwarted it—was led to suicide by his 1952 prosecution for homosexuality and court-ordered hormone injections.⁶ In the United States, McCarthyism was a witch-hunt against both communists and homosexuals even though Joseph McCarthy and Roy Cohn, the chief agents of the purge, were whispered to be gay men themselves.⁷

It was not until the 1960s that a broader current of liberation and change enabled a new generation of young gays and lesbians to cut loose from the moorings of postwar homophile organizations—of which indeed they were often blithely unaware—and to chart a new course toward sexual freedom.⁸ Most gay and lesbian liberation groups that sprang into existence in the wake of the 1969 Stonewall rebellion were radical, leftist, and utopian. Names such as Gay Liberation Front, Lavender Menace, Red Butterflies, Radicalesbians, and Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaries suggest the provocatively socialist leanings of these countercultural activists.⁹ Early gay liberation demonstrations rang with slogans such as: "Ho, ho, homosexual—The ruling class is ineffectual"; "Two, four, six, eight—Smash the family, smash the state"; or in Germany, "*Brüder und Schwestern, ob warm oder nicht—Kapitalismus bekämpfen ist unsere Pflicht*" ("Brothers and sisters, whether gay or not—Fighting capitalism is our duty").¹⁰

Inspired by the "rediscovery" of classical Freudian-Marxist texts such as Wilhelm Reich's *The Sexual Revolution* (1936; English translation 1945) and Herbert Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* (1955), activists of the Stonewall generation were certain that only radical change could bring about the conditions under which sexual diversity would be not just tolerated but embraced by society as a whole. Homosexuality represented such a transgression of prevail-

ing norms, they argued, that it could never be integrated within the existing order. The leading slogan of this era was “Come out!”—a deed which, individually and above all collectively, was deemed sufficient to topple the entire edifice of bourgeois culture.

American feminists of this era coined the motto “the personal is the political,” but when they and the newly emergent gay liberationists sought to advance this notion within existing leftist organizations, they were often rebuffed. The New Left may have challenged the Old Left for its single-minded focus on the “main contradiction”—capitalist relations of production and power in the age of imperialism—but deeply ingrained attitudes of male chauvinism and homophobia still prevailed in most leftist and anti-war groups. With a mixture of embarrassment and indignation, they were concerned that their political agenda would be sullied by any linkage with sexual deviance and therefore tended to dismiss the gay and lesbian challenge to bourgeois norms as a form of “lifestylism.” Some gay men and lesbians involved in New Left organizations were purged by their comrades for making good on the “come out” slogan of that era, while others placed such a high priority on their role within leftist groups that they chose to remain in the closet (see the contribution by David Thorstad).¹¹ While a handful of gay leftists sought to build cadre organizations, such as the short-lived Lavender and Red Union (Los Angeles), others founded new, programmatic periodicals—*The Body Politic* (Toronto), *Gay Left* (London), *Emanzipation* (Berlin/Munich), *Mietje* (Amsterdam), and *Gai Pied* (Paris).

Despite their utopian goal of transforming society as a whole, the activists of the Stonewall generation turned out to have only limited success at changing the sexual politics even of socialist and left-wing groups. Instead, their impact was initially confined to the gay movement itself, where they launched debates on the revolutionary nature of homosexuality. But here, too, they were soon challenged and in most instances superseded by advocates of an integrationist, assimilationist, “one-issue” approach to gay rights; in New York, for example, the Gay Liberation Front yielded to the Gay Activists Alliance, and in Berlin, the Homosexuelle Aktion Westberlin lost ground to the Allgemeine Homosexuelle Arbeitsgemeinschaft.¹² Moreover, the dialectic of personal and political liberation often

replaced militance with new and increasingly visible forms of gay culture, community-building, and consumerism that developed in metropolitan centers during the 1970s.¹³

This development was supported by, but also contributed to, a broader trend in the United States and Western Europe beginning in the 1960s that extended civil rights to minorities, including homosexuals. While the repeal of anti-gay laws in Europe was spearheaded by various socialist and labor party governments, for example in England (1967), West Germany (1969), Sweden (1978), and Spain (1978), it was not exclusively to their credit, for liberal and sometimes even Christian Democratic parties also backed these legal reforms, as in the Netherlands (1971).¹⁴ In the United States, too, a patchwork of state governments and judiciaries began to repeal sodomy statutes, and while these actions were primarily backed by Democrats, Republicans were often involved as well. The American picture was further complicated by the action of state and local governments to extend protection to homosexuals under equal rights ordinances, even in states where the sodomy statute remained on the books.

Overall, leftist politicians (to say nothing of those of other parties) by no means aimed to encourage the development of a distinctive gay identity and culture. On the contrary, their goal—usually implicit rather than explicit—was the seamless social integration of homosexuality, indeed the domestication of homosexuals by drawing them into the fold of what would come to be known as “family values.” Contrary to the politicians’ intentions, however, these law reforms invariably led to greater public visibility of homosexuality and in some instances—West Germany, for example—were actually a precondition for the emergence of gay militancy. Authorities sometimes responded negatively: in England, for example, the decriminalization of sexual acts between consenting adults in private was followed by stepped-up prosecutions of homosexuals on charges of public indecency,¹⁵ and in France, the government moved to ban *Gai Pied* on grounds of obscenity.¹⁶

While leftist politicians generally supported the extension of formal rights in the 1960s and 1970s, some of their leaders continued to harbor strong prejudices against homosexuality. In Germany, the Social Democratic senator of Hamburg Helmut Schmidt, who later

rose to Federal Chancellor, was instrumental in police crackdowns on gay bars in 1966.¹⁷ In France, the Socialist government of François Mitterrand fulfilled a campaign promise to gay voters by placing homosexuality on a legal par with heterosexuality in 1982, but only a few years later, when the government was implicated in covering up the police murder of Joseph Doucé, a pedophile, the Socialists tried to squelch gay protests.¹⁸ France's Socialist government may have introduced anti-discrimination laws in 1985, but in 1991, when the Socialist Edith Cresson, France's first woman Prime Minister, was asked to comment on a British report that she had once characterized England as overrun by homosexuals, she begged the question by jocularly belittling lesbianism.

Taking the balance of ten years of Socialist government in France, the weekly *Gai Pied* concluded that it had been a mixed blessing: it had instituted some legal advances, but it had given scandalously little attention to AIDS—even though it was French scientists who had first detected the virus (see the contribution by Jan Willem Duyvendak). The inaction of the French Socialists when confronted with AIDS mirrored the response of conservative governments elsewhere: throughout the first world, pervasive homophobia and racism allowed the epidemic to run rampant among marginalized groups. AIDS was of concern only to the extent that it threatened to spread among the population at large—as if the straight, white population were the only group worth protecting.

Western European Social Democracy may have done little to advance gay liberation during the 1970s and 1980s, but Eastern European gays living under regimes installed by Moscow were faring far worse.¹⁹ The Soviet Union and its satellites had an utterly negative attitude toward homosexuality, and in Cuba, gays were consigned with other “antisocialist delinquents” to labor camps (Unidades Militaries Para el Aumento de la Producción) beginning in 1965—at a time when many Western social revolutionaries held up Cuba as a paradisiacal model.²⁰ Even in the German Democratic Republic—the country with the strongest historical heritage of homosexual emancipation in the precommunist era—it was not until the 1980s that very circumspect gay discussion groups were able to come into existence under the protection of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (see the contribution by Denis Sweet). Elsewhere in

Eastern Europe, initiatives in this direction were even more constrained.²¹ In most countries where the Communists have lost power in recent years, homosexual movements have quickly emerged, although their prospects remain unclear.²² Concerning the situation of gays and lesbians under Communist regimes in Asia we have regrettably little information, but there are various indications that they have been subject to intense persecution.²³

The foregoing examples have demonstrated two trends that can actually be traced back far earlier than the Stonewall rebellion: the policies of socialist and communist parties and regimes toward homosexuality have been at best ambivalent and often much worse; even so, many gay liberationists have espoused socialism. Indeed, from the first stirrings of homosexual emancipation, a number of its pioneers and most prominent advocates—Magnus Hirschfeld in Germany, André Gide in France, and Harry Hay in the United States, to name just three examples—placed their hopes for “liberty, equality, and fraternity” in socialism and resolutely adopted a leftist stance. At the turn of the century, the preeminent defender of homosexuals in England, Edward Carpenter, wrote prolifically on sexuality, democracy, and socialism.²⁴ For decades, his books enjoyed an international resonance and were enthusiastically received within the labor movement and intellectual circles. Carpenter’s long-term relationship with a working-class man, George Merrill, in the English countryside struck such contemporary observers as E. M. Forster as an exemplary anticipation of a future utopia in which the boundaries between classes and between rural and urban life would be overcome for all, including gay people.

Although classical political liberalism was also heir to the legacy of the French Revolution and claimed to advance individual liberties, these early advocates of homosexual emancipation spurned it and instead embraced socialism as the sole political force that posed a comprehensive challenge to bourgeois society. To them, liberalism seemed limited to freedom of the marketplace; when it came to questions of sexual freedom, liberalism was too closely tied to bourgeois respectability to open up the perspective of radically restructuring all social relations. This promise was held out by both socialism and anarchism, and two contributions in this volume (by

Walter Fähnders and Richard Cleminson) deal with anarchist approaches to homosexuality in Germany and Spain.

The essays in this volume demonstrate that historically, socialist and anarchist support for homosexual rights has been at best half-hearted and often entirely absent. Of course, the same is true of other political tendencies, be they liberal or conservative. Despite the negative or at best mixed record of virtually all political currents on the issue of homosexuality, socialism is singled out for particular attention here because its project was, and is, to fulfil the emancipatory goal of the Enlightenment: the universal liberation of humankind from oppressive ideologies and exploitative social structures. In criticizing the left's failure to advance the cause of homosexual emancipation, we aim not to denounce it wholesale but to hold it to its own high ideals.

In the following, we will offer a brief historical overview of socialists' attitudes toward homosexuality, highlighting the contours and background of their profound ambivalence. "Socialism" is, of course, notoriously a catch-all term, encompassing movements, parties, and regimes of socialists, Communists, and Social Democrats as well as utopian socialists and anarchists. This historical survey does not pretend to be exhaustive and will focus instead on certain key issues:

1. The public-private dichotomy, central to liberal political thought, has long been a problem for socialism. Both the utopian socialists and classical Marxists criticized the public-private dichotomy, but the latter never advanced beyond this to develop a political theory of gender and sexuality.
2. The Marxist current of socialism has always differentiated itself from utopian socialism by claiming to be an objective, "scientific" endeavor, and socialist views on (homo)sexuality were crucially shaped by Enlightenment thinking about nature as well as nineteenth-century scientific (biological and medical) paradigms, particularly Darwinism. Although Marxism as a social theory recognizes that humans have no fixed nature and are a product of history, socialists (like liberals and others) have tended to view gender and sexuality as biological givens and thus essentially ahistorical.

3. Socialists have repeatedly ascribed homosexuality to the “class enemy,” contrasting the “manly” vigor and putative purity of the working-class with the emasculated degeneracy and moral turpitude of the aristocracy and haute bourgeoisie. The socialist concept of progress has long envisioned a utopia in which homosexuality would have no place, indeed would automatically disappear as an outdated remnant of oppressive vice and social malaise.

It might be added, finally, that simple opportunism has played an important historical role in politics. Even those socialist parties and regimes that endorsed legal reforms concerning homosexuality proved willing in moments of political need to compromise their principles by invoking stereotypical images of homosexuality to smear their opponents.

PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC

The legal principles of both Enlightenment thought and, in the ensuing decades, of liberalism were based on the principle of non-interference by the state in citizens’ private lives. In 1791, early in the course of the French Revolution, the Constituent Assembly acted to decriminalize sodomy, which had long been treated as a capital crime in the world of Christendom. Because they were opposed to the union of church and state, Enlightenment *philosophes* and jurists emphasized the distinction between sin—the province of the church—and crime—of concern to the state. They argued that any sexual practice which infringed upon the rights neither of individuals nor of society as a whole belonged to the sacrosanct sphere of private life in which the state was to intervene not by punishment but by prophylaxis.²⁵

Beginning in the seventeenth century, politics was conceptualized as distinct from the private sphere. John Locke’s formulation of the classical liberal viewpoint, for example, distinguished two fundamentally distinct institutions within society, the state and the family, each of which fulfilled different needs. The state, founded on a voluntary and rational contract, was to protect fundamental individual rights, above all that of property. In so far as they shared

the same basic rational principles, (male) individuals were free and equal within the public arena. The purpose of the family, on the other hand, was reproduction and childrearing; as a private zone, it was the site of intimacy, affection, and mutual care, but it also teemed with irrational desires. Passion (broadly ascribed by Locke to women) had to be rigorously excluded from the political realm, for desire and emotion rendered people incapable of arriving at any uniform understanding of rights and benefits. Locke concluded that the family, unlike the state, could not be based on voluntary contract but instead required control by patriarchal authority.²⁶

Since eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberalism grounded the entire domain of public politics on “a passionless, deprivatized sameness of true understanding,”²⁷ it had scant interest in developing a political theory of gender, sexuality, or difference. When it came to the actual practice of non-interference in individuals’ sexual lives, however, the liberal separation of private and public spheres quickly ran up against its limits and showed inconsistencies. Prostitution was a chronic concern because it transmitted venereal diseases, and same-sex practices—particularly in such institutional settings as barracks, prisons, orphanages, dormitories—were also worrisome.²⁸ Confronted with these obstacles, liberals vacillated uneasily between the principles of utilitarianism, seeking the greatest good for the greatest number, and *laissez-faire*, allowing individuals to pursue their own interests.²⁹ While it was widely agreed that public hygiene was a valid rationale for political and medical intervention within the sexual realm, advocates of utilitarianism debated the proper scope of the state’s role.

Initially introduced by the Napoleonic regime, a police system of registering prostitutes was gradually implemented throughout Europe in the course of the nineteenth century. While the aim of registration was to control sexually transmitted diseases, it was of course also used for surveillance of the demimonde of prostitution, linked in many ways with the criminal underworld. Faced with the challenge to otherwise privatized sexuality posed by prostitution, liberal sexual ideology responded by upholding—if not creating—a double standard: bourgeois women were supposed to be protected, but promiscuity on the part of bourgeois men was tacitly condoned, with lower-class women providing a “necessary outlet” for the

male sexual “drive.” Moreover, while prostitutes were subjected to medical examinations, their customers were not, which meant that the regulations were far from effective in preventing the spread of venereal disease. Thus the issues around prostitution not only forced political liberals to compromise the principle of non-interference in sexual matters but also led to a policy that failed to meet its own modest goals. By the late nineteenth century, the registration of prostitutes faced mounting opposition from several quarters: religious groups denounced it, because the state was endorsing vice; feminists criticized it, because it condoned the aggressive sexuality of males; and socialists opposed it, because it promoted the exploitation of working-class women by the bourgeoisie.³⁰

Concerning such areas as family, sexuality, and gender, nineteenth-century socialism had much in common with liberalism, for they were joint heirs of Enlightenment principles. But in contrast to liberalism, certain currents of utopian socialism, especially in France, espoused an ideal of sexual freedom so sweeping that it tended to erase the Enlightenment distinction between public and private spheres. The most prominent of these utopians, Charles Fourier, devoted attention not just to the organization of labor but also to sensual pleasure. He envisioned the ideal communal city, the phalanstère, as a place for non-monogamous sexual relations of all kinds, including the “sapphic” and the “pederastic” (see the contribution by Saskia Poldervaart). By granting such importance to sexual issues, the utopian socialists in a sense recognized that the personal is political, but their sexual radicalism was contemptuously dismissed by the scientific socialists, especially in Germany.

Karl Marx was keenly aware of the connection between politics, economy, and family, and he attacked liberal ideology for locating economic relations as well as the family in a private, apolitical zone. But Marx’s critique of the distinction between public and private spheres stopped at the half-way point, for while he bared the connection between economic exploitation and other social relations, he did not extend his analysis to the family. When discussing German divorce legislation in his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, for example, Marx stoutly defended the integrity of the family against individual rights, and he went on to condemn

Fourier (along with Joseph Proudhon and Claude Henri Saint-Simon) in the following terms:

. . . [their] movement of opposing universal private property to private property finds expression in the animal form of opposing to marriage (certainly a form of exclusive private property) the community of women, in which a woman becomes a piece of communal and common property. It may be said that this idea of the community of women gives away the secret of this yet completely crude and thoughtless communism. Just as woman passes from marriage to general prostitution, so the entire world of wealth (that is, of man's objective substance) passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the owner of private property to a state of universal prostitution with the community.³¹

Marx could only imagine the sexual freedom advocated by Fourier as a form of prostitution tantamount to a relapse into a more primitive, "bestial" stage of social development.

To be sure, the hollowness of bourgeois family values was exposed in *The German Ideology* (1845-46), where Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels remarked: "The dissolute bourgeois evades marriage and secretly commits adultery."³² And in *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), they charged the bourgeoisie with tearing apart families by forcing women as well as children to sell their labor power on the market. Responding to the charge that communism would make all women sexually accessible to all men, they mockingly exposed the universal promiscuity of capitalist society:

Our bourgeois, not content with having the wives and daughters of the proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other's wives. Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with, is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalized community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women

springing from that system, i.e., of prostitution both public and private.³³

But *The Communist Manifesto*'s scathing attack on the hypocrisy of capitalism when it came to family values was by no means a critique of the family itself.

In *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (1884), Friedrich Engels did advance to a more sophisticated analysis of family and gender. Engels's book was based on the research of the ethnologist Lewis Henry Morgan, whose evolutionary theory of the family held that there was a universal, progressive development from a primitive matriarchy, in which promiscuity reigned, to patriarchal authority, in which monogamy was the standard. Engels elaborated on Morgan's work by linking the origins of private property, the division of labor, and ultimately class differences with the historical oppression of women. However, he did not extend his insights to a critique of marriage as an institution. Indeed, neither Marx nor Engels ever questioned heterosexual monogamy. Blaming capitalism for secretly encouraging licentiousness, they argued that natural moral principles would finally be fulfilled in the socialist future, when "monogamy, instead of declining, finally becomes a reality—for the men as well."³⁴ Marx and Engels were convinced that once society was liberated from the deformities of class oppression, a natural, heterosexual, monogamous love would finally flourish.

It was also in *The Origin of the Family* that Engels set forth two brief remarks on the subject of same-sex practices—the only explicit treatments of the subject in the entire oeuvre of Marx and Engels published during their lifetimes. Characterizing Athenian family life during classical antiquity, Engels noted that "the men . . . sank into the perversion [*Widerwärtigkeit*] of boy-love, degrading both themselves and their gods by the myth of Ganymede."³⁵ These repellent practices were by no means limited to the ancient Greeks, Engels continued, for centuries later the migrating Germanic barbarians succumbed to "moral degeneration" when some of the Goth tribesmen adopted "serious unnatural vices."³⁶ In their private correspondence, however, Marx and Engels employed far more jocular and smutty language when commenting on homosexual contemporaries (see the contribution by Hubert Kennedy).³⁷

The sexual-political stance staked out by Marx and Engels was

perpetuated and elaborated by leaders of the Second International in Germany and Austria. The lack of a coherent view on sexuality among the Social Democrats arose in part because they were forced into the defensive by their political opponents, especially the Christian Socialists in Austria, who blamed working-class women for prostitution and attacked the Social Democrats (and especially women party members) for allegedly promoting free love. The Social Democrats reacted by stressing their own morality, and some of them argued that they were morally superior to the bourgeoisie as well as the Christian Socialists. The female editor of a Social Democratic newspaper for working women wrote in 1896: "We want a different, a better morality than the prevailing one protected by the district attorney. We are working for marriage and morality that is pure in the truest sense of the word."³⁸

In the eyes of such Social Democrats as August Bebel, Karl Kautsky, and Eduard Bernstein, the entire "sexual question" came about because young men could not afford to marry early and support a family. Capitalism not only caused economic exploitation and social inequality, it also facilitated immorality and sexual exploitation of working-class women by bourgeois men. Prostitution was a typical vice of class society, while marriage based on love was the precondition for the healthy sexual ethics of socialist society. The Social Democrats did attack prevailing sexual mores and Christian asceticism, but their critique remained highly ambivalent, for they never questioned either monogamous marriage or the family as such.³⁹ Like Marx and Engels, the Social Democrats of the Second International reproached bourgeois males for hypocritically violating their own moral principles and upholding a double standard for men and women; the solution was not to open up for women the same sexual opportunities available to men, but to advocate monogamy for everyone. In doing so, they actually endorsed the nineteenth-century ideal of bourgeois respectability.

Apart from broadening access to early marriage, Social Democratic writers on sexuality proposed moderation and abstinence as solutions for the "sexual question."⁴⁰ Sexual energy was to be sublimated and channelled into healthy outdoors activities, such as sports and hiking. They echoed contemporary medical opinion by regarding masturbation as harmful and something to be avoided.

Eduard Bernstein, for example, was convinced that self-abuse would result in homosexuality and sadomasochism.⁴¹ Some Social Democratic leaders asserted that masturbation was an upper-class phenomenon and rare among the working class.⁴²

Social Democratic attitudes toward contraception were at best ambivalent. In Germany, for example, Ferdinand Lassalle criticized neo-Malthusianism as a typically capitalist solution for overpopulation, and his standpoint was shared by many other leaders of the Second International. According to Lassalle, the problem was not so much population growth as the unequal distribution of goods between rich and poor. The adoption of contraceptive techniques by proletarians could easily lead them to a resigned acceptance of the capitalist system. And in Austria, Otto Bauer actually advocated a massive population increase precisely in the working class to gain more voters for the left.⁴³ Moreover, such Social Democrats as Lassalle, Bebel, and Wilhelm Liebknecht opposed contraception because it would lead, like masturbation, to “unproductive” sexuality. Those few Social Democrats who joined Karl Kautsky in supporting birth control simultaneously warned that it could be misused to promote licentiousness. In France as well, many socialists regarded neo-Malthusianism as a counterrevolutionary movement. They were suspicious of population planning not just because they associated contraception with the corrupt and frivolous aristocracy and haute bourgeoisie, but even more because they feared that its acceptance would substitute individual self-help for genuine social reform. For socialists, the question was not whether individuals should have a right to contraception, but whether birth control resulted in a harmful loss of self-discipline and social responsibility.⁴⁴

The single work dealing with sexuality most widely read by rank-and-file members of the SPD was not Engels’s *The Origin of the Family* but August Bebel’s *Woman under Socialism* (1879). Bebel’s remarks on same-sex practices went considerably beyond the scanty information offered by Engels by bringing the vice of classical antiquity into the present:

Yet another evil, frequently met, must also be shortly touched upon. Excessive sexual indulgence is infinitely more harmful than too little. A body, misused by excess, will go to pieces, even without venereal disease. . . . But temperance seems

difficult to youth. Hence the large number of ‘young old men,’ in the higher walks of life especially. The number of young and old *roués* is enormous, and they require special irritants, excess having deadened and surfeited them. Many, accordingly, lapse into the unnatural practices of Greek days. This crime against nature is today much more general than most of us dream of: upon that subject the secret archives of many a police bureau could publish frightful information. But not among men only, among women also have the unnatural practices of old Greece come up again with force. Lesbian love, or Sapphism, is said to be quite general among married women in Paris; according to Taxil, it is enormously in practice among the prominent ladies of that city. In Berlin, one-fourth of the prostitutes are said to practice “tribady”; but also in the circles of our leading dames there are not wanting disciples of Sappho.⁴⁵

Bebel’s standpoint is notable for attributing same-sex practices solely to sexual excess as well as describing it an upper-class, metropolitan, and foreign vice.

It is clear that the nineteenth-century socialists associated with the Second International failed to integrate sexuality into their social and political philosophies in any coherent way. In Marxist theory, all issues concerning the family and sexuality were subsumed within the “superstructure” that rested upon a given society’s economic “basis,” and this is where Marxists have focused their attention.⁴⁶ This corresponded to a similar shortcoming of liberal ideology, and both liberalism and Marxism (including its revisionist variant in Social Democracy) implicitly made the same differentiation between the public/private and political/personal spheres. Socialism, however, and especially Marxism differed from liberalism by virtue of prioritizing the public and the political. Explicitly rejecting the radical individualism of their contemporary, Max Stirner, Marx and Engels held that the ideal of harmony between humankind and nature as well as among people required a total socialization of the individual.

Wherever Marxists have come to power in the twentieth century, the individual has had little value outside collective demands, and the personal has been rigorously subordinated to collectivist poli-

tics, opening the door to state intrusion. The private sphere has enjoyed far less protection under socialist regimes than under liberal ones, and in many instances the very notion of a protected private sphere was simply abandoned as soon as Communist parties came to power. Overall, socialist regimes have remained true to the credo first enunciated by Marx and Engels: heterosexual monogamy would prevail in the workers' state, and homosexuality would simply disappear.

ENLIGHTENMENT, NATURE, AND SCIENCE

The difficulty of integrating sexuality within the political theories of both liberalism and socialism can be traced back to Enlightenment thought. The *philosophes* had often characterized the Christian view of sin and virtue as "artificial" and sought to replace it with a new, secular notion. They attempted to locate morality within nature rather than in some spiritual realm, for they were convinced that unspoiled human nature offered the foundation for both moral behavior and harmonious relations between the individual and society. Sexuality played an important role in the development of the life sciences as well as in some influential social and political theories, such as that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.⁴⁷ Taken as a "natural" phenomenon, however, sexuality was open to two distinct moral meanings. To the extent that it contributed to procreation and was connected to harmonious heterosexual relations and maternity, it was applauded; but if sexuality was premature, illicit, excessive, or motivated by sheer lust, it was considered socially subversive.⁴⁸

Enlightenment thought on sexuality connected it to divergent interpretations of human nature and was thus ambivalent. Sexuality outside of the private sphere of heterosexual intimacy was regarded as part of "untamed" nature that challenged normative and optimistic readings of nature as a positive source of social order and virtue. Rousseau, for instance, both celebrated and condemned sexuality, while Donatien Alphonse François de Sade, Paul Henri Thiry d'Holbach, Pierre Choderlos de Laclos, and others argued that natural drives were ethically neutral or even blindly amoral and thus could not provide a foundation on which to build society. They shared a new sense of nature as profoundly riven by inner tensions,

contradictions, and disruptive forces.⁴⁹ Above all, sexuality undermined the optimistic idea of moral nature, and as such it could not be integrated in schemes that sought to improve society by reason.

Scientific socialism remained deeply committed to the Enlightenment belief in progress. Marxists and Social Democrats attacked religious tradition and social customs in the name of reason and (positivistic) science. They presumed that the rationalization of human society was rapidly rendering the force of individual differences based on sex or irrational desires irrelevant. Convinced that harmony between the individual and society would come about by a radical transformation of society or social engineering, socialist intellectuals devoted scant attention to those areas of human experience that were contradictory or difficult to predict and control by reason. This outlook led many of them to regard sexuality not as a positive force in life but on the contrary as a basically irrational, unproductive, and egoistic drive that posed a potential risk to social harmony and therefore had to be brought under rational control.

The philosophy of Marx and Engels certainly was innovative because it was one of the first “sociological” theories. They held that humankind, far from having a fixed nature, is instead determined by the natural as well as the social environment; people form themselves in the process of transforming nature by work. This breakthrough stopped short, however, when Marx neglected to historicize sexuality, which he regarded as part of nature rather than of culture. Implicitly or explicitly elevating nature to a standard by which to judge sexual behavior, scientific socialists—like liberals—relied on biological notions of sexuality. Many Social Democrats were confident that science, medicine, education, and social hygiene would shape a healthy sexuality capable of being integrated into society and fulfilling collective needs. “Sexuality became an issue for the proletariat, because filth was to be turned into cleanliness, disease into health, degeneration into integration.”⁵⁰ Adopting medical views current at that time, scientific socialists found the unleashing of passion abhorrent; in the interest of a rational ordering of sexual life, they relied on hygienist solutions and emphasized the beneficial effects of education, hard work, self-mastery, sublimation, and marriage. The idea of social responsibility, the interests and solidarity of the social body, and scientific social reconstruction took

precedence over individual liberties. Ultimately, many socialists eagerly adopted the precepts of eugenics, which seemed to hold out the promise of rational mastery of the natural laws of evolution by linking genetics, demographics, and medicine.⁵¹

Because eugenics has come to be associated with the Nazi racial state, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that “racial hygiene” was long embraced far more ardently by the left than the right. From the fin de siècle onward, socialists and progressives—including Social Democrats, the Fabians, and even the women’s movement—regarded it as a scientific and even humanitarian method for improving society. Among its more prominent leftist advocates over the ensuing decades were Karl Pearson, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, George Bernard Shaw, Havelock Ellis, Eden and Cedar Paul, H. G. Laski, Graham Wallas, H. G. Wells, Julian Huxley, Joseph Needham, C. P. Snow, Magnus Hirschfeld, and Emma Goldman. Although socialists regarded class distinctions as artificial and propounded equality among the classes, they nonetheless regarded differences among individuals within a particular class as an important natural given. Since the collective took precedence over the individual, they had no scruples about expanding state intervention into the reproductive and family sphere. To be sure, socialists held that it would be possible to distinguish between the effects of heredity and environment only in a country without class distinctions, and thus the Soviet Union would eventually be accorded the status of the best laboratory for a socially responsible eugenic program.

Socialists’ endorsement of eugenics was fundamentally predicated on their acceptance of the Darwinian concept of evolution, which gained an increasingly broad following among Social Democrats and liberals from the 1870s onward—against embittered opposition from Christians and conservatives, who clung to the notion of creationism.⁵² Far from seeming purely scientific and hence ethically neutral, the evolutionary hypothesis was fraught with moral and political implications.⁵³ For contemporaries, the main political problem with Darwinism was how to understand the axiom of the struggle for existence. Liberals saw it primarily as a mirror of competition within the capitalist marketplace and went on to develop the doctrine of Social Darwinism.⁵⁴ For scientific socialists, Darwinism was attractive for a different reason: it held out the

prospect of ineluctable development toward a higher stage of evolution, which they interpreted as the emergence of socialism.⁵⁵ Marx himself may have criticized Darwin as a bourgeois thinker, but the paradigmatic breakthrough of Darwinism was so widely recognized that Engels sought to link Marx with it posthumously. In his eulogy for Marx in 1883, Engels stated: “Just as Darwin developed the law of the development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the developmental law of human history.”⁵⁶ This understanding accelerated the emergence of revisionist Social Democracy, supplanting the perspective of Marx himself with evolutionary gradualism, revolution with reform.⁵⁷ With the goal not of class struggle but of elevating the working class morally and intellectually, the revisionists advocated proletarian hygiene, moderation, and self-control.

With its axioms of sexual selection and natural variation, Darwinism contributed importantly to the emergence of the discipline of sexology, or *Sexualwissenschaft*—a term first used in 1906, but based upon psychiatric and forensic studies going back to the 1850s; Darwinism became crucial in its development starting in the 1860s.⁵⁸ Prior to this time, medicine had taken the reproductive pairing of male and female to be the unquestioned norm and telos of sexual behavior, while same-sex practices were taken to be a manifestation of degeneracy resulting from poor social and moral conditions. Early sexology was primarily concerned with labelling deviant behaviors and bracketing them as perversions, and several doctors clung to Bénédict Auguste Morel’s studies of degeneration (1857) and tried uneasily to integrate it with Darwinism. They argued that while (hetero)sexuality was a “natural” and healthy component of the evolutionary process, degeneracy was not per se “unnatural,” for nature, by moving backwards in a sort of process of devolution, was capable of producing monsters; and indeed, the Austrian psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing characterized homosexuals as “nature’s stepchildren.”⁵⁹ As signalled by the European-wide reception of Max Nordau’s *Degeneration* (1892), this concern became something of an obsession affecting many nations by the late nineteenth century.⁶⁰

While various doctors tried to use Darwinism to prove that heterosexuality was a natural norm for higher forms of life and that homosexuality was necessarily degenerate, others suspected that

Darwinism undermined the conventional differentiation between male and female.⁶¹ As early as 1868, Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, who introduced the notion of male homosexuality as being a sort of psychological intermediacy (“a female soul in a male body”), referred to Darwin—albeit rather fleetingly—to argue that natural species “mesh and merge imperceptibly.” He invoked Darwinism to state that the existence of homosexuality itself throughout the plant and animal kingdoms was tantamount to a “law of nature.”⁶² Inspired by Ulrichs’s pioneering work and synthesizing the work of Morel and Darwin, Richard von Krafft-Ebing began to argue as early as 1877—nine years before the first publication of his classic *Psychopathia sexualis*—that homosexuality is a kind of biological intermediacy between male and female and properly belongs within the realm of nature as a “twist of fate,” typically inborn and caused by hereditary factors. Over the course of the 1880s, Krafft-Ebing increasingly challenged the criminalization and prosecution of homosexuals, and by the 1890s he directly supported the repeal of § 175, the German anti-sodomy statute.

The world’s first homosexual emancipation organization, the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee (Wissenschaftlich-humanitäres Komitee) founded in 1897 by the physician Magnus Hirschfeld, began its work by circulating a petition for the repeal of § 175, and Krafft-Ebing was one of its first signatories. Hirschfeld was, if anything, even more profoundly indebted to Darwinian notions of evolution and gradualism than his predecessors.⁶³ Whereas Darwin had envisioned a gradual transformation of life forms over time, Hirschfeld applied this notion synchronically rather than diachronically, arguing that there was a seamless continuum of human sexual types ranging between fully male and fully female. Hirschfeld contested the categorical correlation of gender roles with sexual dimorphism by proposing a range of male-to-female “intermediacy” that remained within the domain of natural variation, anomalous yet nonpathological. He charted a spectrum of intermediacy comprising (but not limited to) hermaphroditism, androgyny, homosexuality, and transvestism.

From 1897 until Hitler’s accession to power in 1933, Germany differed from all other countries by virtue of its homosexual emancipation movement, and socialist discussions of homosexuality

were more frequent and outspoken here than anywhere else. Germany attached exceptional prestige to science, which enjoyed the special patronage of the government; as a result, striking advances were made in the natural and social sciences, and this country was the world center for the production of knowledge in the domain of sexuality, including medical as well as non-medical theories. Hirschfeld's arguments for the repeal of § 175 were based first and foremost on scientific knowledge, and although he appealed to all political parties to heed his message, the most positive response came precisely from the Social Democrats. Joining Krafft-Ebing among the first signatories of Hirschfeld's petition was August Bebel, the parliamentary leader of the Social Democracy, and he was the first politician to speak in favor of repealing § 175 in an 1898 Reichstag speech.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, professional medicine's challenge to the authority of the church advanced a paradigm shift in the understanding of homosexuality, transferring it from the realm of virtue and sin to the domain of health and illness. Called upon to deliver expert testimony in court, physicians increasingly held that certain categories of defendants should be sent to clinics rather than to prisons. In Germany, both the intellectual elite and the burgeoning socialist movement saw themselves as the cutting edge of social and political progress. There was a particular harmony between the homosexual emancipation movement and the Social Democrats, for both subscribed to the Enlightenment ideal of using scientific knowledge to improve society. While the Social Democracy appropriated for itself the Baconian motto "Knowledge is power" (*Wissen ist Macht*), Hirschfeld's personal motto was "Per scientiam ad justitiam" ("Through knowledge to justice"). His biologicistic understanding of homosexuality was endorsed by socialists (and later Communists) beyond Germany's borders: commenting on the Bolshevik repeal of the tsarist anti-sodomy law, the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* of 1929 explicitly cited Hirschfeld's research.⁶⁴

Yet it must be noted that support for the repeal of § 175 was by no means universal in the socialist movement, and some Social Democratic Reichstag delegates distanced themselves firmly from Bebel. Moreover, the adoption of a biologicistic understanding of

homosexuality proved to be a mixed blessing: most socialists vacillated between seeing homosexuality as a natural phenomenon on the one hand and a pathological form of degeneracy on the other. When the Social Democrats did offer support, their allegiance to the principle of liberty, equality, and fraternity for all (and thus also for homosexuals) was mingled with the uneasy feeling that condoning homosexual behavior might lead to its increase. Thus some socialist politicians defended the right to be homosexual, but not the right to engage in homosexual conduct.

When homosexuality was dealt with by medical science at the turn of the century, many doctors argued that culture could actually promote such tendencies in individuals who were by no means homosexual by birth. In undisturbed nature, simple instinct directed all creatures toward procreation, but civilization introduced an element that often distorted the natural course of libidinal development. The child was sexually undifferentiated, and culture could mold its instincts to take any direction or form. In culture, so-called natural instincts often were twisted. Therefore, such doctors as Max Dessoir, Albert Moll, and Emil Kraepelin stressed that it was necessary to foster heterosexual relations in human society.⁶⁵ Heterosexuality and procreation had to be incited and encouraged, these doctors argued; otherwise the birth rate would fall—an issue that stirred increasing alarm throughout Western Europe in the years around World War I.⁶⁶

The notion that homosexuality could be either inborn or acquired also contributed to the ambivalence toward the homosexual emancipation movement felt by socialists. It left them hoping that in the socialist state of the future, heterosexual relations would prevail because the incidence of inborn homosexuality would turn out to be as low as most scientists assumed (Hirschfeld spoke of a fixed minority of approximately 2.2% in all times and places),⁶⁷ and moreover even the born homosexual could perhaps be dissuaded from engaging in homosexual conduct. Acquired or culturally mediated homosexual behavior was unquestionably to be prevented. The legal situation in the Soviet Union during the 1920s reflected this outlook: homosexual acts in general were decriminalized, but sanctions were invoked where such practices abounded due to social and cultural circumstances, as in the Muslim parts of the country.⁶⁸ According to

Lenin, the very notion of sexual emancipation was typical of capitalist societies and a symptom of bourgeois degeneracy.⁶⁹ Above all, the class struggle required the suppression of individualistic sexual desires and self-sacrifice in the interests of the collective.

Those openly gay Russians who initially sided with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 because of its repeal of the tsarist anti-sodomy statute were to be disappointed, for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union became increasingly puritanical and homophobic under Stalin and finally promulgated a new anti-sodomy statute in 1934, closing a fifteen-year span in which it had been possible to cherish the hope of social and cultural advances (see the contribution by Laura Engelstein). Stalinist sexual politics, as propagated internationally through the Comintern, and Hitler's accession to power in 1933 signalled the eradication of the homosexual emancipation movement in Germany, the only country where it had really flourished; and the 1930s marked an epochal setback for homosexual rights. In a Europe under the sway of fascism and Stalinism, homosexual emancipation was ruthlessly removed from all political agendas. In Spain, even the anarchist movement took recourse to the most odious homophobic stereotypes (see the contribution by Richard Cleminson).

While their commitment to Darwinism may have led socialists to tilt toward the notion of inborn rather than acquired homosexuality up to World War I, the theories of Sigmund Freud gained growing influence in socialist discussions during the 1920s and 1930s.⁷⁰ Stressing psychological factors in human sexuality and positing the notion of the polymorphous perversity of infants, Freud explicitly rejected Hirschfeld's notion of sexual intermediacy, which held that each individual had a genetically fixed sexual disposition from the moment of conception. On the contrary, Freud argued, it was the successful or unsuccessful resolution of a universal Oedipus complex that determined whether an individual's fundamental bisexuality would be channelled into heterosexuality or homosexuality. The Communist psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich, founder of Freudo-Marxism, sociologized but simultaneously simplified Freud's theory by arguing that oppressive conditions under patriarchal capitalism stifled and deformed the libido, thereby actually inducing homosexuality. Since Comintern doctrine defined fascism as capitalism

in its most extreme and openly terroristic form, Reich was predisposed to diagnose Nazi society as rife with homosexuality tinged with sadism. Harkening back to Marx and Engels, he was convinced that homosexuality would automatically disappear under communism and that healthy heterosexuality would be practiced by everyone (see the contribution by Harry Oosterhuis).

This pattern of thought, resonant throughout the theory and practice of exiled and underground antifascists during the Nazi era, reached perhaps its greatest degree of refinement in the “Critical Theory” of the Frankfurt School (see the contribution by Randall Halle). As Stalinism asserted its authority throughout the Comintern, however, Freud-Marxism fell increasingly into disfavor, and socialist discussions in the post-World War II era often reverted to biological notions of homosexuality, as shown by the endocrinological research of Günter Dörner in the German Democratic Republic (see the contribution by Denis Sweet).⁷¹ On the other hand, a number of socialist and Communist regimes continued after 1945 to entertain the notion of homosexuality as a social form of “bourgeois decadence” fundamentally foreign to “really existing socialism” (see the contribution by David Thorstad), which somewhat paradoxically represents a reversion to the attenuated Freudianism of Reich’s theories. In this way the notion of an underlying unspoiled (heterosexual) proletarian nature could more or less be saved.

Reich’s writings enjoyed something of a renaissance during the sexual revolution of the 1960s and were even embraced by gay liberationists, although Reich had always been anything but supportive of homosexual emancipation. His legacy and that of the Frankfurt School were still quite evident in the writings of Reimut Reiche, a German leftist who wrote on sexual liberation in the late 1960s.⁷² At this time, Herbert Marcuse was one of the few “classic” leftist thinkers who took a more positive view of homosexuality. Marcuse was more or less exceptional because he associated liberated sexuality with play and art. Celebrating “polymorphous sexuality” as a realm of release from labor, he valorized sexual pleasure as an alternative to the productivist ethos of both capitalism and communism.⁷³ Ultimately, however, the sexual revolution’s cooptation by consumerism made even Marcuse increasingly skeptical about the prospects for sexual liberation under capitalism.⁷⁴

MORAL PURITY

In the 1830s, at the zenith of Fourier's utopian phalanstères, socialism was radical in its sexual politics. But towards the mid-century, scientific socialism became more puritanical, accompanying the process of embourgeoisement as documented in Marx and Engels's attacks on prostitution and their ideology of monogamy for both women and men.⁷⁵ Social Democrats of the Second International, convinced that they needed to attain respectability in order to achieve their goals, became increasingly rigid on moral issues. Any hint of unconventionalism in the sexual domain was abhorrent to them, as it provided grist for the mills of their opponents. In Germany, this process was stimulated by the Anti-Socialist Laws promulgated in 1878, but perhaps even more so by their repeal in 1890. Bismarck's acceptance of forward-looking social security and health insurance legislation simultaneously integrated the proletariat more closely within the state and accelerated the shift from revolutionism to reformism within the Second International. But the Social Democratic Party itself also contributed to proletarian embourgeoisement by establishing Workers Education Associations in cities throughout Germany, where laborers were taught to admire and emulate the achievements of middle-class culture.⁷⁶ By the turn of the century, the socialists had become staunch supporters of marriage and monogamy as part of their mission of civilizing the proletariat.

From the perspective of the educated public, homosexuality had long been linked with aristocratic decadence, for example, with the late Roman Empire or France's ancien régime. At the fin de siècle, this stereotype was heightened by the often homoerotic perversity of the neo-romantic and decadent movements in European literary culture.⁷⁷ This literary current had tremendous appeal for homosexual writers and readers alike, for it was a form of thinly veiled protest against the norms of bourgeois respectability.⁷⁸ Among the most prominent adepts of *l'art pour l'art* were Paul Verlaine and Arthur Rimbaud in France, Oscar Wilde in England, Louis Couperus in the Netherlands, and Stefan George in Germany. Moreover, some leaders of the homosexual emancipation movement, such as Adolf Brand and Kurt Hiller, favored an "aristocracy of the spirit" over any purely democratic system, in part because they were con-

vinced that the *hoi polloi* (and socialist voters) would never be in favor of advancing the interests of homosexuals.

Individualism and aestheticism, favored by many homoerotic artists, were loathed by most socialists and left-wing artists. Even though Wilde wrote an essay in favor of socialism, he became the prime example of the stereotyped image of the decadent, effeminate aesthete corrupting working-class boys.⁷⁹ The contemporary literary movement most frequently embraced by the socialist left, Naturalism, proved incapable of treating homosexuality despite its stunning frankness in the depiction of social and sexual misery, including alcoholism, prostitution, venereal disease, and incest. The failure of Naturalist writers to deal with homosexuality arose in part from its status as the unspeakable, but also because they were committed to portraying proletarians as victims of oppressive social conditions beyond their control. Later as well, during the 1920s, those artistic groups that came nearest to the socialist left, such as the French surrealists under André Breton, were strongly homophobic—even though it was the surrealists who rediscovered the Marquis de Sade, the homosexual without remorse, and the leading surrealist novelist, René Crevel, was openly gay.⁸⁰ In the late 1920s and 1930s, the proletarian writers' movement that hailed the achievements of the Soviet Union was also relentlessly heterosexist in orientation.⁸¹ This turn toward homophobia in the proletarian writers' movements reflected a growing conviction that the supposed effeminacy of homosexual men was the very antipode of the healthy manliness of working-class males and symptomatic of both bourgeois decay and economic collapse. As the Great Depression intensified political antagonisms, both the Communist insurrectionists on the left and the "revolutionary" National Socialists on the right increasingly valorized militant manliness, with a concomitant emphasis on the alleged weakness, effeminacy, and political unreliability of homosexuals.⁸²

The cornerstone of Hirschfeld's theory of inborn homosexuality, the notion of sexual intermediacy, challenged the notion of a rigid male-female dichotomy. While a certain number of homosexual men no doubt presented the very signs of effeminacy expected by Hirschfeld (and regarded as degenerate by the socialists), the "third-sex" model was always controversial even within the homosexual emancipation movement itself. Beginning in 1903, a group

of German homosexuals organized in Adolf Brand's Community of the Special (*Gemeinschaft der Eigenen*) firmly rejected Hirschfeld's biologism and instead advanced social concepts of male bonding and pedagogical eros, stressing that homosexuality was inherently masculine. This was a politically eclectic group, comprising extreme nationalist right-wingers as well as Nietzschean and Stirnerian anarchists.⁸³ The masculinist, bisexual, and pedophile ideals of this group were also endorsed by such important anarchists as Erich Mühsam and Johannes Holzmann (see the contribution by Walter Fähnders). This group continued its attacks on Hirschfeld through the 1920s, and a similar revulsion for effeminacy was now also voiced by Friedrich Radszuweit, the leader of a third homosexual emancipation organization, the League for Human Rights (*Bund für Menschenrecht*), as well as by André Gide in his *Corydon* (1911; rev. ed. 1920). Moreover, Hirschfeld's "third sex" flew in the face of the new manly ideal held up by left- and right-wing parties alike. Although the vigorous masculinity of both the Communists and the Nazis may have been attractive to gay men and may even have allured many of them to vote for the Nazis (see the contribution by Manfred Herzer), it was by definition an ideal that excluded and indeed repressed homosexuality.

Rather than attacking bourgeois respectability and the ideal of masculinity, socialism supported them. There was a gap between the leaders of the left-wing formations and their followers, for the leaders tended to support sanitary movements and hygiene policies to "civilize" the proletariat. This socialist emphasis on respectability certainly bolstered the homophobia that already existed within the working classes and may even have created prejudices where none existed previously. The process of embourgeoisement gradually transformed an earlier culture of proletarian everyday life in which men had been "available."⁸⁴ There is some evidence to suggest that proletarian culture was less puritanical before socialist ideology was inculcated among workers by their leaders. Before the rise of medical theories of homosexuality, masculinity and femininity had been a matter of active versus passive sex roles. At least among certain nationalities and ethnic groups, working-class men were willing to engage in homosexual practices as long they penetrated their male sex partners—and all the more so when they found hetero-

sexual sex difficult or expensive to obtain. But as sexology erased the line between active and passive acts, all same-sex practices became stigmatized as a sign of effeminacy; working-class men who might earlier have been engaged in homosexual practices on their own terms were now dishonored even if they took the active role. The ideal of masculinity promoted by socialist leaders was heteronormative, and it was contrasted to homosexuality. Considered effeminate and bourgeois, visible homosexuals were far removed from the socialist ideal of manhood. They even endangered it to the extent that they tried to seduce working-class men and were attracted by rugged masculinity, which was certainly a fascinosum for many bourgeois homosexual men such as Edward Carpenter, who were drawn to socialism because they were charmed by the rough “working-class beast.”

Some socialist leaders nominally supported the goals of the homosexual emancipation movement, but in the absence of a worked-out theory of sexuality it was all too easy for them to relapse into “othering” discourse. Western Europe has a venerable tradition of attributing sexual depravity to the other—be it across national boundaries (the “French,” “German,” “English,” “Italian” vice), confessional divides (the satanic cults of medieval heretics and Renaissance witches, Martin Luther’s tirades against the sodomitical Vatican), or hemispheres (nineteenth-century Europeans saw the Orient as “a living tableau of queerness” that seemed to exude “perverse morality” and “dangerous sex”).⁸⁵ In addition, the educated bourgeoisie associated homosexuality with social and political decline resulting from aristocratic vice, as recounted in Edward Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-83). In this vein, the socialist approach was to ascribe such widespread notions as degeneracy and decadence to their major opponents—the aristocracy, the clergy, and the capitalist class. Whenever a scandal revealed the homosexuality of members of the upper classes, the socialist press would intervene to denounce their corrupt morals and to trumpet the threat they posed to society, contrasting this with the healthy heterosexual life of the working class that predestined it to assume leadership. In their treatment of scandals involving sexual exploitation, prostitution, and pederasty, socialists certainly expressed their underlying anxieties about sexuality in general.

There has been a multitude of homosexual scandals over the past decades, and the socialist press has often played a leading role in publicizing them, certainly the more spectacular ones.⁸⁶ When socialist leaders or activists were involved—Johann Baptist von Schweitzer (1862) in Germany, for example, or Jacob Israël de Haan (1904) in the Netherlands—they felt the full force of their comrades' contempt (see the contributions by Hubert Kennedy and Gert Hekma). But in contrast to such cases, which often led to party purges, the socialists fanned the flames of scandals involving members of the aristocracy or the haute bourgeoisie in order to harden working-class indignation. Given the socialists' lip-service to homosexual emancipation, this was frequently an opportunistic ploy to set off the homosexual "oppressors" from the "authentic" victims, workers. The most spectacular of these scandals occurred in Germany and concerned Alfred Krupp (1902), the "cannon king" who consorted with Italian youths on the isle of Capri; Philipp zu Eulenburg (1907-09), a diplomat and close friend of the kaiser; Fritz Haarmann (1924), a serial murderer linked to the SPD-governed police; and Ernst Röhm (1931-32), the head of the Nazi paramilitary SA organization.

The Röhm affair is dealt with by two contributors to this volume who take contrary standpoints. Manfred Herzer maintains that the German left was entirely justified in reporting on the turmoil over Röhm's homosexuality within the ranks of the Nazi Party and that the Communists never compromised their pledge to support homosexual emancipation. Harry Oosterhuis, on the other hand, argues that the Social Democrats and Communists knowingly exploited widespread homophobic prejudice in order to discredit their political opponent, thus revealing a long-standing ambivalence that ultimately led them to excoriate homosexuality as a typically National Socialist vice throughout the years of the antifascist struggle.

It is noteworthy that during the years of Hitler's rise to absolute power, both the left and the right used homosexuality as a stereotype to tar their opponents. A particularly vivid instance of this left-right convergence came in 1933 with the case of Marinus van der Lubbe, who was pronounced guilty of setting fire to the Reichstag; he was denounced both by the Nazis as a left-wing arsonist and by the communists as a homosexual anarchist (see the contribution

by Harry Oosterhuis). At the very time when the Nazis declared homosexuality a form of “sexual bolshevism” and, in 1934, executed Ernst Röhm, Maxim Gorky in the Soviet Union declared that wiping out homosexuality would lead to the end of fascism.⁸⁷ Stalinist homophobia caused an international panoply of left-wing writers such as W. H. Auden, Christopher Isherwood, Klaus Mann (see the contribution by Harry Oosterhuis), André Gide, and Jef Last (see the contribution by Patrick Pollard) to repudiate Soviet policy, and many of them were then castigated as homosexual cowards and traitors by their former comrades.

We have thus returned to our starting point, the perpetuation of fascist and antifascist homophobia in the post-World War II setting. With the breakup of the anti-Hitler alliance and the demarcation of a new adversarial relationship by the Iron Curtain, the Western and Eastern powers alike underscored their heteronormativity by linking the other with homosexuality. During the Cold War era, Guy Burgess’s 1951 defection to the Soviet Union was exploited to heighten Western fears of a shadowy Homintern, and the attempted defection of Günter Liftin, the first person slain at the Berlin Wall in 1961, was denounced in the East German press as the desperate act of a male prostitute cut off from his customers in the Western sector.⁸⁸ All decent heterosexuals, it was implied, would be entirely content to remain in the workers’ state.

CONCLUSION

For almost a full century now, the revolutionary prospect of socialism has fuelled opening forays first of the homosexual emancipation and later of the gay liberation movements, both in Europe and in North America. It inspired Edward Carpenter and Magnus Hirschfeld at the turn of the century; André Gide and Richard Linsert in the post-World War I years; Harry Hay and Jim Kepner in the post-World War II era; and the British and American Gay Liberation Front, the Italian Fuori!, the French FHAR, the German “Rotzschwule,” and the Dutch Red Faggots following the Stonewall rebellion.⁸⁹ While the official socialist parties of Northwestern Europe may have made only limited contributions to homosexual emancipation, they certainly have a better record than conservative

and Christian parties and even the liberals, who have consistently, if contradictorily, underlined the freedom of private life. Even so, parties across the entire political spectrum have gradually come to endorse at least some of the movement's goals. As it has advanced, the gay movement has changed as well, and it now finds itself pulled in divergent directions. Gay leftists who still subscribe to the ideals expressed in Marxist and utopian socialist writings now find themselves at demonstrations shoulder-to-shoulder with members of ACT UP and Queer Nation, to say nothing of gay conservatives and gay Christians.⁹⁰ The successes achieved by the contemporary gay movement despite or precisely because of its diversity support Foucault's argument that "there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case. . . ." ⁹¹

At the close of the twentieth century, the welfare state has reached its apogee in Northwestern Europe. As blue-collar workers historically committed to class struggle have become relatively well-to-do and minoritarian, socialist parties have increasingly lost their traditional base of support and been forced into the defensive. Depending only on the socialists would mean relying on an ineffectual partner, for nowhere are they in a stable position of power. Long before the collapse of "really existing socialism" in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, gay and lesbian movements began developing their own autonomous politics independent of parties. They moved in this direction in part because the coalition with leftism so frequently led to disappointment, particularly when gays and lesbians working within socialist parties were called upon to subordinate or abandon their own goals in favor of party platforms. In other cases the gay-left coalition failed to yield results because a single-minded reliance on one party placed limits on lobbying other parties and entering compromises.

We have reached a time when inherited ideologies are no longer capable of laying claim to the undivided loyalty of the gay movement, if indeed they ever were. As it has developed autonomous theories and practices, the gay movement's choice of coalition partners has increasingly come to be based on pragmatism and success in advancing the gay agenda. Indeed, the roles of the gay movement

and political parties have undergone a notable switch in recent years, with parties currying the support of the gay movement rather than vice versa. This signals a shift from the desire for politics to a politics of desire, going far beyond traditional socialist ideologies.

NOTES

1. For an international overview of the homophile movement in the mid-1950s, see Marvin Cutler (i.e., W. Dorr Legg), ed., *Homosexuals Today: A Handbook of Organizations and Publications* (Los Angeles: Publication Division of One, Inc., 1956).

2. On Mattachine's radical beginnings, see John D'Emilio, *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 57-74. On the leftist origins of the COC, see Hans Warmerdam and Pieter Koenders, *Cultuur en ontspanning: Het COC 1946-1966* (Utrecht: NVIH, COC & Interfacultaire Werkgroep Homostudies, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, 1987), p. 58. Among the founders of Arcadie, André Baudry was a moderate while Jacques de Ricaumont and Roger Peyrefitte were conservatives. See Jacques Girard, *Le mouvement homosexuel en France 1945-1980* (Paris: Syros, 1981), pp. 39-73, especially pp. 56 and 71.

3. For an interesting collection of memoirs and other texts documenting the subjective sense of continuity during the mid-century decades, see *Keine Zeit für gute Freunde: Homosexuelle in Deutschland 1933-1969*, ed. Joachim S. Hohmann (Berlin: Foerster, 1982).

4. See Robert G. Moeller, "The Homosexual Man Is a 'Man,' the Homosexual Woman is a 'Woman': Sex, Society, and the Law in Postwar West Germany," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 4 (1993-94): 395-429. The Federal Constitutional Court's 1957 ruling was reaffirmed by the entire West German Bundestag in 1986; see *ibid.*, p. 427. See also Michael Sartorius and Christian Schulz, *Paragraph 175. (abgewickelt) / Wider Gutmachung* (Hamburg: MännerschwarmSkript, 1994).

5. On the dismissal of the economist Hein Vos, see Rob Tielman, *Homoseksualiteit in Nederland: Studie van een emancipatiebeweging* (Amsterdam and Mepel: Boom, 1982), pp. 162-63.

6. On Turing, see Andrew Hodges, *Alan Turing: The Enigma* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 456-527.

7. On McCarthyism and homosexuality, see John D'Emilio, "The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America," in *idem, Making Trouble: Essays on Gay History, Politics, and the University* (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 57-73; also in *Passion and Power: Sexuality in History*, ed. Kathy Reiss and Christina Simmons with Robert A. Padgug (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), pp. 226-40. For a collection of pertinent documents, see Jonathan Katz, *Gay American History* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976),

pp. 91-105. On p. 101, Katz reports that “on January 14, 16, and 21, 1952, journalist Drew Pearson’s private diary refers to unsubstantiated rumors, circulating among Congressmen, the FBI, and the White House, of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s being involved in homosexual activity,” citing as his source Drew Pearson, *Diaries, 1949-1959*, ed. Tyler Abell (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), pp. 188-89, 190, 192. On Roy Cohn, see Nicholas von Hoffman, *Citizen Cohn* (New York: Doubleday, 1988).

8. See Dennis Altman, *Homosexuality: Oppression and Liberation* (New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1971), and *Radical Records: Thirty Years of Lesbian and Gay History*, ed. Bob Cant and Susan Hemmings (London: Routledge, 1988).

9. For a contemporary account of the groups that emerged in the wake of the Stonewall rebellion, see Donn Teal, *The Gay Militants* (New York: Stein and Day, 1971).

10. The German slogan, used at a 1972 demonstration in Münster, appears in “Bekannt, daß ihr anders seid,” *Der Spiegel* 27.11 (March 12, 1973): 46-62; quote on p. 48. The two American slogans, from the 1970 and 1971 Christopher Street marches in New York, are recalled by a participant (Steakley); the first was a take-off on the “Ho, ho, Ho Chi Minh-The Vietcong is going to win” of antiwar demonstrations. Similar slogans appear, for example, in Toby Marotta, *The Politics of Homosexuality* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), p. 177.

11. On similar developments in Germany, see Andreas Salmen and Albert Eckert, *Zwanzig Jahre bundesdeutsche Schwulenbewegung 1969-1989* (Cologne: Bundesverband Homosexualität e.V., 1989), pp. 37-43.

12. See Marotta, pp. 139-47 et passim; Salmen and Eckert, p. 46; and Jeffrey Weeks, *Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain, from the Nineteenth Century to the Present* (London: Quartet, 1977), pp. 185-206.

13. See Dennis Altman, *The Homosexualization of America, the Americanization of the Homosexual* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982).

14. For a historical survey of the pertinent laws, see Peter Tatchell, *Europe in the Pink: Lesbian and Gay Equality in the New Europe* (London: GMP, 1992).

15. See Weeks, p. 176.

16. See Jan Willem Duyvendak and Mattias Duyves, “*Gai Pied* after Ten Years: A Commercial Success, a Moral Bankruptcy?” *Journal of Homosexuality* 25.1-2 (1993): 211. The government’s plan to ban *Gai Pied* was halted by massive protests.

17. See Manfred Herzer, “Helmut Schmidt und die Flutkatastrophe—das schwule Hamburg 1950-1970,” in *Hamburg von hinten*, ed. Ernst Meibach (Berlin: Bruno Gmünder, 1982), pp. 65-81.

18. Joseph Doucé, a Baptist minister who gave pastoral care to sexually marginalized groups at his Christ the Liberator Center, was taken into police custody and found dead two months later. Gay organizations charged the police with slaying him, but a thorough investigation never took place and no one was indicted, implicating the Socialist government in the cover-up. See Françoise d’Eaubonne, *Le scandale d’une disparation: Vie et œuvre du Pastor Doucé* (Paris: Editions du

Libre Arbitre, 1990) and Jan van Kilsdonk et al., *Voor alles pastor: De zorg van Joseph Doucé voor sexuele minderheden* (Aalsmeer: Dabar, 1993).

19. See Jürgen Brockmann, "Antihomosexualität in Osteuropa," in *Seminar: Gesellschaft und Homosexualität*, ed. Rüdiger Lautmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1977), pp. 447-60. For a survey of the relevant East European laws, see *Rosa Liebe unterm roten Stern: Zur Lage der Lesben und Schwulen in Osteuropa*, ed. HOSI Wien/Auslandsgruppe (Hamburg: Frühlings Erwachen, 1984).

20. On Cuba, see Luis Salas, *Social Control and Deviance in Cuba* (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 150-77; Allen Young, *Gays under the Cuban Revolution* (San Francisco: Grey Fox Press, 1981); and Marvin Leiner, *Sexual Politics in Cuba: Machismo, Homosexuality, and AIDS* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994). For a vivid memoir by one of the roughly 15,000 gay men who left Cuba in the 1980 Mariel boatlift, see Reinaldo Arenas, *Antes que anochezca* (Barcelona: Tusquets, 1992), available in English as *Before Night Falls*, trans. Dolores M. Koch (New York: Viking, 1993); Arenas also authored a poetic report, *El Central* (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1981), available in English as *El Central: A Cuban Sugar Mill*, trans. Anthony Kerrigan (New York: Avon, 1984). The Cuban regime has also found its defenders; see, for example, Lourdes Arguelles and B. Ruby Rich, "Homosexuality, Homophobia, and Revolution: Notes toward an Understanding of the Cuban Lesbian and Gay Male Experience" in *Hidden from History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past*, ed. Martin Duberman, Martha Vicinus, and George Chauncey, Jr. (New York: New American Library, 1989), pp. 441-55.

21. For developments in Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic, see Raelynn Hillhouse, "Communist Politics and Sexual Dissidents," in *Sexual Minorities and Society: The Changing Attitudes toward Homosexuality in the 20th Century Europe*, ed. Udo Parikas and Teet Veispak (Tallinn: Institute of History, 1991), pp. 66-77. See also Sergej Shcherbakov, "On the Relationship between the Leningrad Gay Community and Legal Authorities in the 1970s and 1980s," *ibid.*, pp. 94-104.

22. See Harry Oosterhuis, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Gert Hekma, "The European Post-War Gay and Lesbian Movement," *Homologie* (Amsterdam) 16.4 (July-August 1994): 22-28.

23. For a historical survey of the status of homosexuality in China, see Fang Fu Ruan and Molleen Matsumura, *Sex in China: Studies in Sexology in Chinese Culture* (New York: Plenum, 1991), pp. 107-44; contemporary attitudes are treated on pp. 159-80. Significantly, homosexuality goes entirely unmentioned in *Sexual Behaviour in Modern China—A Report of the Nation-Wide "Sex Civilisation" Survey on 20,000 Subjects in China* (Shanghai: Joint Publishers, 1992); the authors, Liu Dalin, Ng Man Lun, and Zhou Li Ping, were reportedly eager to treat homosexuality in this 866-page study but prevented from doing so. See also YanHong Krompacky, "Gay Life in China: A Closet Within a Closet," *Harvard Gay & Lesbian Review* 1.4 (Fall 1994): 15-17.

24. See Sheila Rowbotham and Jeffrey Weeks, *Socialism and the New Life: The Personal and Sexual Politics of Edward Carpenter and Havelock Ellis* (London: Pluto, 1977).

25. See Jacob Stockinger, "Homosexuality and the French Enlightenment," in *Homosexualities and French Literature*, ed. George Stambolian and Elaine Marks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 161-85, and Gert Hekma, *Homoseksualiteit, een medische reputatie: De uitdoktering van de homoseksueel in negentiende-eeuws Nederland* (Amsterdam: Sua, 1987), pp. 26-31.

26. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), pp. 117-32. See also Linda J. Nicholson, *Gender and History: The Limits of Social Theory in the Age of the Family* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 133-66.

27. Elshtain, p. 119.

28. See Frank Mort, *Dangerous Sexualities: Medico-Moral Politics in England since 1830* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), and Jeffrey Weeks, *Sex, Politics and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality since 1800* (London: Longman, 1981), pp. 84-93.

29. On the sexual politics of two leading utilitarian philosophers, see Wendy Donner, "John Stuart Mill's Liberal Feminism," *Philosophical Studies* 69 (1993): 155-66, and Miriam Williford, "Bentham on the Rights of Women," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36 (1975): 167-76. In a 1785 text, Bentham argued for reforming the English sodomy law: Jeremy Bentham, "Offenses against One's Self: Pederasty," ed. Louis Crompton, *Journal of Homosexuality* 3 (1977-78): 389-405, 4 (1978-79): 91-107. On the historical background, see also L. Crompton, *Byron and Greek Love* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

30. See Hekma, *Homoseksualiteit, een medische reputatie*, pp. 149-60; Annet Mooij, *Geslachtsziekten en besmettingsangst: Een historisch-sociologische studie, 1850-1950* (Amsterdam and Meppel: Boom, 1993), pp. 28-80; Judith Walkowitz, *Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); David J. Pivar, *Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1868-1900* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1973).

31. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, ed. Dirk J. Struik, trans. Martin Milligan (Moscow: Progress; New York: International, 1964), p. 133.

32. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress; London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1964), p. 195.

33. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, trans. Samuel Moore, in idem, *Selected Works in One Volume* (Moscow: Progress; New York: International, 1968), pp. 50-51.

34. Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, trans. Alec West, in *ibid.*, p. 511.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 502.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 506.

37. See Andrew Parker, "Unthinking Sex: Marx, Engels, and the Scene of Writing," in *Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory*, ed. Michael Warner (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 19-41.

38. *Arbeiterinnenzeitung*, quoted by Karin J. Jusek, *Auf der Suche nach der Verlorenen: Die Prostitutionsdebatten im Wien der Jahrhundertwende* (Ph.D. dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 1993), p. 165.

39. See Gunter Runkel, *Sexualität und Ideologien* (Weinheim: Beltz, 1979), pp. 148-62.

40. See Werner Thönnessen, *The Emancipation of Women: The Rise and Decline of the Women's Movement in German Social Democracy 1863-1933*, trans. Joris de Bres (London: Pluto, 1973); Richard J. Evans, *The Feminist Movement in Germany, 1894-1933* (London: Sage, 1976); and Annette Mühlberg, "Arbeiterbewegung und Sexualität im deutschen Kaiserreich," *Mitteilungen aus der kulturwissenschaftlichen Forschung* (Berlin) 15.31 (November 1992): 119-73.

41. See R. P. Neuman, "The Sexual Question and Social Democracy in Imperial Germany," *Journal of Social History* 7 (1974): 271-86, here p. 274.

42. The notion that masturbation was relatively rare among the working class was supported by the findings of the Kinsey Institute several decades later. See Alfred C. Kinsey et al., *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1948), pp. 339-43, and idem, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1953), pp. 148-50.

43. See Doris Byer, "Sexualität-Macht-Wohlfahrt: Zeitgemäße Erinnerungen an das 'Rote Wien,'" *Zeitgeschichte* 14 (1987): 444.

44. Angus MacLaren, "Some Secular Attitudes toward Sexual Behavior in France, 1760-1860," *French Historical Studies* 8 (1974): 622-23.

45. August Bebel, *Woman under Socialism*, trans. Daniel De Leon (New York: New York Labor News Press, 1904), pp. 164-65. After becoming the first German parliamentarian to speak out in favor of reforming § 175, Bebel modified this text by adding a single clause conceding that homosexuality was in some cases "in-born"; in a footnote added in 1909, he remarked that the Eulenburg scandal "proved" that homosexuality was widespread in the upper classes. A. Bebel, *Die Frau und der Sozialismus* (Berlin: Dietz, 1974), p. 238.

46. Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," in idem, *Problems in Materialism and Culture* (London: Verso, 1980), pp. 31-49.

47. See Ludmilla J. Jordanova, "Naturalizing the Family: Literature and the Bio-Medical Sciences in the Late Eighteenth Century," in *Languages of Nature: Critical Essays on Science and Literature*, ed. Ludmilla J. Jordanova (London: Free Association Books, 1986), pp. 86-116, and Joel Schwarz, *The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

48. See Théodore Tarczylo, *Sexe et liberté au siècle des Lumières* (Paris: Presses de la Renaissance, 1983).

49. See Anthony Pilkington, "'Nature' as Ethical Norm in the Enlightenment," in *Languages of Nature*, pp. 51-85, and Norman Hampson, *The Enlightenment* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), pp. 97-127, 186-217.

50. See Byer, p. 447.

51. See Rudolf Vecoli, "Sterilization: A Progressive Measure?" *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 43 (1959-60): 190-202; Loren R. Graham, "Science and Val-

ues: The Eugenics Movement in Germany and Russia in the 1920s," *American Historical Review* 82 (1977): 1133-64; Michael Freedman, "Eugenics and Progressive Thought: A Study in Ideological Affinity," *Historical Journal* 22 (1979): 645-71; Mark Adams, "From 'Gene Fund' to 'Gene Pool': On the Evolution of Evolutionary Language," *Studies in the History of Biology* 3 (1979): 241-85; Diane Paul, "Eugenics and the Left," *The Journal of the History of Ideas* 45 (1984): 567-90; Atina Grossmann, "The New Woman, the New Family and the Rationalization of Sexuality: The Sex Reform Movement in Germany 1928 to 1933" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984), especially chapter 2, "Motherhood-Eugenics Consensus: The Discourse of Social Health," pp. 334-457; Paul Weindling, "Weimar Eugenics: The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics in Social Context," *Annals of Science* 42 (1985): 303-18; idem, "Die Verbreitung rassenhygienischen/eugenischen Gedankengutes in bürgerlichen und sozialistischen Kreisen in der Weimarer Republik," *Medizinhistorisches Journal* 22 (1987) 352-68; idem, *Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Carl N. Degler, *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 42-43.

52. See *The Comparative Reception of Darwinism*, ed. Thomas F. Glick (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

53. See James Rachels, *Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

54. See *Social Darwinism: Selected Essays*, ed. William Graham Sumner (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

55. See Alfred Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860-1914* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).

56. Friedrich Engels, "Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx," in *Selected Works* (see note 33), p. 435. See also Margaret Fay, "Did Marx Offer to Dedicate 'Capital' to Darwin? A Reassessment of the Evidence," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 39 (1978): 133-46.

57. See *Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate 1896-1898*, ed. and trans. by H. Tudor and J. M. Tudor; and Roger Fletcher, *Revisionism and Empire: Socialist Imperialism in Germany, 1897-1914* (Boston: G. Allen & Unwin, 1984).

58. See Gert Hekma, "'A Female Soul in a Male Body': Sexual Inversion as Gender Inversion in Nineteenth-Century Sexology," in *Third Sex, Third Gender: Beyond Sexual Dimorphism in Culture and History*, ed. Gilbert Herdt (New York: Zone Books, 1994), pp. 213-39.

59. Richard von Krafft-Ebing, *Psychopathia sexualis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der conträren Sexualempfindung*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1887), p. vi.

60. See, for example, Robert A. Nye, *Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

61. Lawrence Birken, *Consuming Desire: Sexual Science and the Emergence of a Culture of Abundance, 1871-1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 57-71.

62. Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, "Memnon." *Die Geschlechtsnatur des mannliebenden Urnings. Eine naturwissenschaftliche Darstellung. Körperlich-seelischer Hermaphroditismus*, 1868 (Leipzig: Max Spohr, 1898), pp. 126, 134.

63. See Magnus Hirschfeld, "Ernst Haeckel und die Sexualwissenschaft," in *Was wir Ernst Haeckel verdanken—Ein Buch der Verehrung und Dankbarkeit*, ed. Heinrich Schmidt (Leipzig: Unesma; Hamburg: Paul Hartung, 1914), vol. 2, pp. 282-84.

64. M. Sereiskii, "Gomoseksualizm," *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 17 (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1930), cols. 593-96.

65. See Emil Kraepelin, *Psychiatrie: Ein Lehrbuch für Studierende und Ärzte*, vol. 4: *Klinische Psychiatrie*, 8th ed. (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1915), pp. 1971-72, and Manfred Herzer, "Albert Moll," in *Homosexualität: Handbuch der Theorie- und Forschungsgeschichte*, ed. Rüdiger Lautmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1993), pp. 60-65.

66. See Emil Kraepelin, "Geschlechtliche Verirrung und Volksvermehrung," *Muenchener medizinische Wochenschrift* 65 (1918): 117-20.

67. Magnus Hirschfeld, *Die Homosexualität des Mannes und des Weibes* (Berlin: Louis Marcus, 1914), p. 493.

68. See Simon Karlinsky, "Russia's Gay Literature and Culture: The Impact of the October Revolution," in *Hidden from History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past*, ed. Martin Duberman, Martha Vincinus, and George Chauncey, Jr. (New York: New American Library, 1989), pp. 347-64.

69. See Clara Zetkin, *Erinnerungen an Lenin* (Berlin/GDR: Dietz, 1975), p. 67, and Fannina W. Halle, *Women in Soviet Russia*, trans. Margaret M. Green (New York: Viking, 1933), pp. 112-14.

70. It should be noted that Freud was cited alongside Hirschfeld in the *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*. See also Manfred Herzer, "Wilhelm Reich und Magnus Hirschfeld—gescheiterte Konzepte sozialistischer Sexualpolitik und Faschismus," *Mitteilungen der Magnus-Hirschfeld-Gesellschaft* 2 (1983): 9-16.

71. See also James Steakley, "Gays under Socialism: Male Homosexuality in the German Democratic Republic," *The Body Politic* (Toronto), no. 29 (December 1976): 15-18.

72. See Reimut Reiche, *Sexuality and Class Struggle*, trans. Susan Bennett (New York: Prager, 1971); Reiche's book appeared originally as *Sexualität und Klassenkampf: Zur Abwehr repressiver Entsublimierung* (Frankfurt a.M.: Neue Kritik, 1968).

73. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955).

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75. See Robert Miklitsch, "Troping Prostitution: Two or Three Things about (Post-) Marxism/Feminism," *Genders*, no. 12 (Winter 1991): 120-39.

76. See Hans Wolf Butterhof, *Wissen und Macht: Widersprüche sozialdemokratischer Bildungspolitik bei Harkort, Liebknecht und Schulz* (Munich: Ehrenwirth, 1978); Dietger Pforte, *Von unten auf: Studie zur literarischen Bildungsarbeit der frühen deutschen Sozialdemokratie und zum Verhältnis von Literatur und Arbeiterklasse* (Giessen: Anabas, 1979); and Eckhard Dittrich, *Arbeiterbewegung und Arbeiterbildung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Bensheim: Pädagogik extra Buchverlag, 1980).

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78. See Gert Mattenklott, *Bilderdienst: Ästhetische Opposition bei Beardsley und George* (Munich: Rogner & Bernhard, 1970).

79. See Ed Cohen, *Talk on the Wilde Side* (New York: Routledge, 1993), and Alan Sinfield, *The Wilde Century: Effeminacy, Oscar Wilde and the Queer Movement* (London: Cassell, 1994).

80. See Michel Carassou, *René Crevel* (Paris: Payard, 1989), pp. 75-100.

81. See Michael Rohrwasser, *Saubere Mädel, starke Genossen: Proletarische Massenliteratur?* (Frankfurt a.M.: Roter Stern, 1975).

82. See George L. Mosse, "Die Idee des 'Neuen Mannes' in modernen revolutionären Bewegungen," *Mitteilungen der Magnus-Hirschfeld-Gesellschaft* 14 (1989): 9-13.

83. See *Homosexuality and Male Bonding in Pre-Nazi Germany: The Youth Movement, the Gay Movement, and Male Bonding before Hitler's Rise: Original Transcripts from Der Eigene, the First Gay Journal of the World*, ed. Harry Oosterhuis and Hubert Kennedy (simultaneously published as the *Journal of Homosexuality* 22.1-2) (New York: The Haworth Press, Inc., 1991).

84. See George Chauncey, *Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), pp. 65-97.

85. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979), pp. 103, 166-67.

86. See Alex Hall, *Scandal, Sensation and Social Democracy: The SPD Press and Wilhelmine Germany 1890-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

87. See Maxim Gorki, "Gegen den Faschismus: Proletarischer Humanismus," *Rundschau über Politik, Wirtschaft und Arbeiterbewegung*, no. 34 (1934): 1298; the Russian original is reprinted in Vladimir Kozlovskii, *Argo russkoi gomoseksual'noi subkul'tury: Materialy k izucheniuu* (Benson, VT: Chalidze, 1986), p. 152. For a Nazi condemnation of Hirschfeld and the sexual reform movement of the Weimar Republic as an aspect of "cultural bolshevism," see, for example, Adolf Ehrh and Julius Schweikert, *Entfesselung der Unterwelt: Ein Querschnitt durch die Bolschewisierung Deutschlands* (Berlin and Leipzig: Eckart-Verlag, 1932), pp. 181-205.

88. See Dieter Berner, "Wie die SED-Propaganda das Stigma Homosexualität zum Rufmord an einem Maueropfer benutzte," *Capri* (Berlin), no. 10 (1990):

38-41; reprinted with additional documentation in *Gay News* (Leipzig) 2.4 (March-June 1991): 1-3.

89. Guy Hocquenghem, *Le desir homosexuel* (Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1972), available in English as *Homosexual Desire*, trans. Daniella Dangoor (London: Alison & Busby, 1978); *Tuntenstreit: Theoriediskussion der Homosexuellen Aktion Westberlin* [ed. Egmont Fassbinder] (Berlin: Rosa Winkel, 1975); Mario Mieli, *Elementi di critica omosessuale* (Turin: G. Einaudi, 1977), also available as *Homosexuality and Liberation: Elements of a Gay Critique*, trans. David Fernbach (London: Gay Men's Press, 1988); *Homosexuality: Power and Politics*, ed. Gay Left Collective (London: Allison & Busby, 1980); *Flaunting It! A Decade of Gay Journalism from The Body Politic*, ed. Ed Jackson and Stan Persky (Vancouver: New Star; Toronto: Pink Triangle Press, 1982).

90. The literature on homosexuality and Christianity has taken on vast proportions, but John Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), has had a particularly strong impact. In the Netherlands of the 1950s and 1960s, Catholic clergy and laity played a crucial role in the social acceptance of homosexuality; see Harry Oosterhuis, *De smalle marges van de Roomse moraal; Homoseksualiteit in katholiek Nederland 1900-1970* (Ph.D. diss., Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1992); English summary on pp. 289-300. Andrew Sullivan, editor of the *New Republic*, has as a practicing Catholic played an important role in shaping recent discussions of gay politics. A conservative gay position has underpinnings in the works of Roger Scruton, *Sexual Desire: A Philosophical Investigation* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1986), and Richard A. Posner, *Sex and Reason* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), while a libertarian position is staked out in Richard D. Mohr, *Gays/Justice: A Study of Ethics, Society, and the Law* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). An explicitly anti-utopian voice is Bruce Bawer, *A Place at the Table: The Gay Individual in American Society* (New York: Poseidon, 1993). See also Marvin Liebman, *Coming Out Conservative* (San Francisco: Chronicle, 1992), and Mel White, *Stranger at the Gate: To Be Gay and Christian in America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

91. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1: *An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978), pp. 95-96.