Rights and Duties in Democracy
A Brief History of Citizenship

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The rise of modern democracy is intrinsically linked up with the development of citizenship. The revolutionary *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* (1789), like the American *Declaration of Independence* (1776), basically proclaims what democratic citizenship is about: specific civil rights and duties.

However, in the broader historical perspective, citizenship is an ambiguous and multiple-layered concept. It is open to a variety of definitions and interpretations. Its meaning is historically contingent and cannot be established without considering the socio-political context in which it was employed. The meaning of citizenship is embedded in changing socio-political frames of thought, debate and practice, which not only reflect, but also shape its social realities. Social values and political objectives are intrinsically part of the concept. The contemporary debate about citizenship, for example, is closely linked with neo-liberal and neo-conservative criticism of the welfare state and of the controversial socio-political legacy of the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 1980s, citizenship has become a fashionable concept all over the political spectrum through which dissatisfaction with specific developments in present society are articulated and certain solutions are put forward. Several social and political issues have been formulated in terms of citizenship: the crisis of the welfare state, ongoing individualisation and the presumed loss of social cohesion, growing ethnic and cultural diversity, the declining trust in parliamentary democracy, and globalisation. Discussions focus on the supposedly disturbed balance between rights and duties. All suggested solutions tend to take the direction of a revitalising of civic virtues, which are defined in terms of individual autonomy and self-reliance as well as of active involvement and social obligations.

Citizenship is an essentially contested concept: its definition and application are not self-evident, but always open for debate, negotiation and strife. Only a historical survey of the changing connotations of citizenship can shed light on its diverse meanings.[1]

In general citizenship is about what draws individuals together into a political community and what keeps that allegiance stable and meaningful to its participants. The sociologist Bryan Turner has broadly defined citizenship as 'a set of practices which constitute individuals as competent members of a community' and which 'over time

[1] On essentially contested concepts see W.B. Gallie, 'Essentially contested concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian* Society, 56 (1956), pp. 167-98. On citizenship as an essentially contested concept: I. de Haan, 'De lachspiegel van het burgerschap', in J.B.D. Simonis, A.C. Hemerijck and P.B. Lehning (eds.), *De staat van de burger. Beschouwingen over hedendaags burgerschap* (Meppel: Boom, 1992), pp. 161-79; B.S. Turner, 'Outline of a theory of citizenship', *Sociology*, 24 (1989), pp. 189-217; S. Hall, 'Burgers en burgerschap', in S. Hall, *Het minimale zelf en andere opstellen* (Amsterdam: SUA, 1991), pp. 155-69; B. Cruikshank, *The Will to Empower. Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 23-4; E.F. Isin and G.M. Nielsen (eds.), *Acts of Citizenship* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2008).

become institutionalised as normative social arrangements'.[2] This overall definition can be specified by pointing to three basic constituents of citizenship, the liberal-democratic ideal in particular. First, citizenship refers to the more or less enduring allegiance between the individual and civil society, the social space of free association that is separate from the state, the market and the private sphere. Second, citizenship is about political and civil participation on the basis of a combined sense of individual autonomy and public commitment: it presupposes a capability of self-direction that is irreconcilable with subordination and dependence. Third, citizenship has to do with rights and entitlements granted and guaranteed by the state on the one hand and with responsibilities and obligations towards the state and the community on the other.[3]

The best way to clarify the notion of citizenship is by outlining its various historical forms in the Western world since the Renaissance. Overall, citizenship is a result of a modernising process that replaced local, fixed and hierarchical patterns of membership in family, feudal and corporate networks with more abstract, flexible and egalitarian conditions of social belonging on a larger scale. The first forms of self-government emerged in autonomous towns, in which the public space of the Greek *polis* as an arena of debate for rational citizens served as a venerable model. The rise of modern liberal citizenship, which was inspired by the Enlightenment idea of the 'natural rights' of man, was a consequence of the centralisation of states and their expanding influence on society. These provoked a growing sense of solidarity among their subjects and the assertion of their common rights vis-à-vis the government. Centralisation and democratisation went hand in hand: the revolutionary conflicts from the late seventeenth century on gradually transferred sovereignty from the body of the monarch (based on divine right and tradition) to the body politic of his subjects (based on a social contract), transforming dynastic states into nation states. The American and French revolutions in the late eighteenth century epitomise this transformation. The liberties granted by the state and the consensual means of governance following in their wake had to be actively secured by citizens. The implementation and expansion of rights - with respect to the number and range of legal, political and later also social rights as well as to the number and range of people who were entitled to them - was realised through political activism

[2] B.S. Turner, 'Postmodern culture/modern citizens', in B. van Steenbergen (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship* (London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 153-68, quote on p. 159.

[3] For the conceptualisation of citizenship and the historical overview of its development that follows, I rely on: M. Walzer, 'Citizenship', in T. Ball and J. Farr (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 211-19; Turner, 'Outline of a theory of citizenship'; S. Macedo, *Liberal Virtues. Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); J.B.D. Simonis, A.C. Hemerijck and P.B. Lehning (eds.), *De staat van de burger. Beschouwingen over hedendaags burgerschap* (Meppel: Boom, 1992); H.R. van Gunsteren and P. den Hoed (ed.), *Burgerschap in praktijken. Voorstudies en achtergronden* ('s-Gravenhage: Sdu uitgeverij, 1992); H.R. van Gunsteren (ed.), *Eigentijds burgerschap* (Den Haag: Sdu, 1992); I. de Haan, *Zelfbestuur en staatsbeheer. Het politieke debat over burgerschap en rechtsstaat in de twintigste eeuw* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1993); Van Steenbergen, (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship*; R. Beiner (ed.), *Theorizing Citizenship* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); R. Aerts and H. te Velde (eds.), *De stijl van de burger. Over Nederlandse burgerlijke cultuur vanaf de middeleeuwen* (Kampen: Kok Agora.Aerts, 1998); D. van Houten, *De standaardmens voorbij. Over zorg, verzorgingsstaat en burgerschap* (Maarssen: Elsevier/De Tijdstroom, 1999); K. Faulks, *Citizenship* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); J. Kloek and K. Tilmans (eds.), *Burger. Een geschiedenis van het begrip 'burger' in de Nederlanden van de Middeleeuwen tot de 21e eeuw* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002).

and struggle. The reverse implication of this continuing democratic politics of citizenship was the growing interference of the state in society.[4]

The contours of citizenship took shape in the field of tension between freedom and equality, rights and duties, autonomy and communion, individualism and the common good, uniformity and diversity, state and society, state administration and self-government, inclusion and exclusion, self-determination and interdependence, and active (civic) and passive (civil) involvement. Passing over different national traditions, roughly five types of citizenship, partly successive, partly overlapping, can be distinguished in Western history since the Middle Ages: (1) classical republican citizenship, defined by self-government and civic virtues; (2) classical liberal citizenship, stressing civil rights against intrusion by the state; (3) liberal-democratic citizenship, centring on political rights, in particular suffrage and political representation; (4) social-liberal and social-democratic citizenship, through which welfare entitlements are granted; and (5) neo-republican citizenship, that emphasises civic responsibilities and obligations.

Classical republican citizenship, the early-modern interpretation of the Greek ideal of the *polis*, implied that citizens are both governors and governed and it stressed civic virtue, the obligation to serve the state. Republican citizenship was not only defined by administrative and military duties, it presumed undivided loyalty and total patriotic commitment. The republican ideal conflated state and citizenship and it subordinated personal life and economic endeavours to the public cause. It was not a democratic right, but an exclusive, honourable status. Only independent, propertied and reasonable men qualified as full citizens. To the extent that this ideal was realised, the location was the small-scale city-state, in which a relatively small group of privileged males could dedicate themselves to politics. Only during the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution did the republican ideal serve as a model for citizenship on a national scale. In patriotic Jacobin ideology, which was inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau's interpretation of the social contract and ideal of the General Will, citizenship was considered as the dominant identity of every adult Frenchman as opposed to alternative identities connected to one's family, estate, region or religion. Efforts to realise the ideal of republican citizenship during the French Revolution, however, involved coercion, civil war, and terror.

Classical liberal citizenship, entailing civil rights on a national scale, emerged in the late eighteenth century as a product of the Enlightenment ideal of natural, inalienable human rights, as proclaimed in the American *Declaration of Independence* (1776) and the French *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* (1789). They established the basic civil rights of individual freedom against unlawful intrusion by the state, such as personal liberty, the integrity of the person, the private sphere, and property, equality before the law, and freedom of religion, thought, speech, press and assembly. The political-philosophical roots of this type of citizenship can be traced back to the ideas of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704). Hobbes distinguished two bodies: the natural body of the individual and the man-made body of the state (the *body politic*). By nature a human being, according to Hobbes, is driven by a restless pursuit of lust and the avoidance of discomfort, giving rise to a continuous urge for power and, given the scarcity of means, a struggle of all against all. This 'natural state' was ended

[4] Alexis de Tocqueville was the first political thinker who pinpointed the connection between social and political democratisation and the centralisation of the state. See his *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (Garden City: Double Day, 1955 (1856)).

because in the interest of their own safety, people of their own free will surrendered the right to use violence to the body politic, thus eliminating the war of all against all. This element constitutes the core of the liberal notion of the social contract and of fundamental civil rights. As Hobbes argues, the individual possesses the inalienable right to protect his body from pain and death.

Hobbes' notion of possessive individualism has been elaborated by Locke. He conceptualised not only possession of one's body, but also that of material goods as an inalienable individual right. This right to material possession followed from the right to possession of one's own body: what the body produces by means of labour, Locke argued, is the rightful property of the person who owns that body. In his view, individuals not only own their body and the products of their labour, but their thoughts, feelings, acts and experiences as well. Locke was one of the first to formulate the idea of a self-contained and continuous self as the essence of the individual. His *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1694) marks the conceptual transition from the Christian soul that is part of a supernatural order to the secular self as a self-reflective monitoring agent who considers his own inner life and outward behaviour.[5] Locke's view of the autonomous and self-responsible person is closely linked to his political doctrines, which hold that society is an aggregate of separate individuals rather than a collective entity. The state, founded on a rational and voluntary contract, is to protect the fundamental property rights of (male) individuals and not interfere in their private lives.[6] Politics should guarantee individual autonomy and freedom, so that citizens can freely develop and improve themselves. Possessive individualism was the core liberal value driving people to improve themselves and fulfil their potential, bringing about social progress in the process. As such, it was the basic principle underpinning liberal thought on citizenship.

Liberal citizenship is based on the Lockean and also Kantian notion of the free and independent human being, who should be able to create his - not yet her - own destiny. Although it also refers to membership of a particular state, it is first and foremost about individual freedom and equality of opportunity. Liberalism stresses the importance of 'negative freedom': the right of citizens to be protected against improper interference by the state or third parties. Neither the state nor any other institution should be able to impose any particular vision of the good life or collective purpose. As long as individuals did not intrude upon the rights and liberties of other citizens, they should be free to determine their own ends. Whereas republican citizenship was exclusive and stressed active duties, liberal citizenship was inclusive and largely relied on the passive enjoyment of rights. Another difference is that the latter is only a partial state: whereas republican

[5] K. Danziger, 'The Historical Formation of Selves', in R.D. Ashmore and L. Jussim (eds.), *Self and Identity. Fundamental Issues* (New York and Oxford: University Press, pp. 137-59.

[6] Locke and other liberal political thinkers define politics as distinct from the private sphere of the family. The family, which purpose is reproduction and child-rearing, is the site of intimacy, affection, and mutual care. Since it is dominated by irrational desires, which are especially ascribed to women, the family and the associated values of nurture and care have to be excluded from the political realm, for desire and emotion render people incapable of arriving at any rational understanding of rights and benefits. Lock concludes that the family, unlike the state, can not be based on voluntary contract but instead requires control by patriarchal authority. On the gendered character of political philosophy and citizenship see J.B. Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman. Women in Social and Political Thought* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981) and J.B. Elshtain, *Meditations on Modern Political Thought. Masculine/Feminine Themes from Luther to Arendt* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).

citizenship had absorbed the person in its totality, liberal citizenship only conferred legal status. In liberalism, the state and politics are not goals in and for themselves, but rather the instruments that should safeguard the individual's autonomy and self-development in private life, civil society and on the market.

However, classical liberal citizenship still resembled its republican predecessor to the extent that political rights and participation were still exclusive and rather elitist. For the better part of the nineteenth century suffrage and eligibility were restricted to the minority of the male population that met certain requirements of property, education, independence, and competence. The granting of political rights was geared to the liberal values of possessive individualism and independent contractual exchange. Women were excluded from political citizenship (and to some extent even from full civil citizenship), and the same was true for lower middle-class and working-class males – to say nothing about the poor, colonised peoples or, in the United States, black slaves. Through the gradual extension of suffrage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, liberal citizenship was democratised. More and more people acquired full political membership of the national community. Universal suffrage and eligibility established the right of all adult citizens to have access to the parliamentary process and be represented in government. This was the outcome of the struggles of the labour and feminist movements; of the introduction of a comprehensive national system of education and rising levels of literacy; of the development of mass-media and new means of communication and transportation; of mass-mobilisation during the First World War and - last but not least - of the response of the governing élites to the threat of revolution. They tried to counter massive upheaval by granting political and also, to an increasing extent, social rights, in return for co-operation and national integration.

Social-liberal and social-democratic citizenship originated in the late nineteenth century and, through the workings of the welfare state, matured in the second half of the twentieth century. This form of citizenship involves entitlements (and obligations) that concern economic and social security, including income, education, health, and welfare. Such entitlements, in particular income-guarantees in case of sickness, disability, unemployment or retirement, provided formal rights with a material foundation. Social citizenship was the answer to the contradiction between liberal ideals (individual autonomy and opportunities) on the one hand and capitalist realities (social and economic inequality) on the other. The argument underpinning social citizenship is that civil and political rights can only materialise when there are no social and economic impediments to their exercise. Social security, welfare assistance, state-funded education and collective health care arrangements are put in place in order to mitigate socio-economic inequalities induced by the free market. The main goal of the various emancipation movements emerging from the late nineteenth century onwards was to remove obstacles blocking the realisation of citizenship for disadvantaged groups: first the working class and women, and later, from the 1960s on, also youths, ethnic minorities, homosexuals, the handicapped and patients. The 1960s protest movement and other emancipation movements of the 1960s and 1970s can be seen as a continuation of the development of liberal-democratic citizenship, embracing now an array of social institutions and also what until then had been considered as the private sphere. Unequal relations of power in society as a whole were questioned and politicised. There was a strong belief that the

welfare state would fully realise the egalitarian and integrative potential of democratic citizenship and thus enable all people to participate in civil society and politics.

The most recent model of citizenship, the neo-republican one, evolved from mounting neo-liberal and neo-conservative criticism of social citizenship. In the 1980s and 1990s, debates on citizenship centred on the presumed decline of the quality of citizenship, in particular the dwindling of civic virtues, in Western democracies. The revived interest in citizenship marked the end of the tacit post-war consensus, which had been articulated most clearly by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall in his *Citizenship and Social Class*.[7] Defining equality as the core value of democratic citizenship and considering liberalism as its starting-point, Marshall distinguished three historical phases in its development: civil, political, and social citizenship - as discussed above - which were institutionalised in constitutions and law courts, in parliaments, and in welfare states respectively. According to Marshall the history of modern citizenship is basically a progressive extension of rights. After the gaining of civil liberties and universal suffrage, the realisation of social rights constituted the pinnacle of democratic citizenship. The welfare state would guarantee the well-being and full participation of all citizens in the community. Social security arrangements, universal education and comprehensive health services would eventually remove all inequalities that hampered individual emancipation and civil participation.[8] In Marshall's view there is a fundamental antagonism between citizenship and capitalism. Although capitalism had generated individual freedom and high standards of living, full citizenship in the sense of equal opportunity for all could only be realised through the domestication of the market-economy by the state.

Marshall's social-democratic model formed an influential paradigm for the post-war welfare state in Western European countries. From the early 1980s on, however, it came under pressure. Marshall's critics, ranging from neo-liberals to neo-conservatives, feminists, communitarians and political theorists, argued that his model was inadequate, both for understanding the historical development of citizenship in different countries and for meeting the challenges contemporary Western democracies were facing. Marshall's account of the development of citizenship in terms of succeeding phases and linear progression seems to be modelled on the British example and hold true for countries like France, the Netherlands, and Belgium as well, but it does not apply to countries like Germany and the former communist world.

In Germany the absence of a successful bourgeois revolution and the attempt to incorporate the middle class and the working class in the nation from above by an authoritarian government, resulted in a superficial realisation of political citizenship and a significant implementation of social citizenship. Neither Nazi Germany nor the Soviet Union and other communist countries provided substantive civil and political rights, but social citizenship was developed to a large extent. This suggests that the establishment of social citizenship before the full realisation of civil and political rights may obstruct the development of civil society and democracy.

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[7] T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); T.H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (New York: Anchor, 1965).

[8] Recently an extension of Marshall's model has been proposed: after the development of civil, political, and social citizenship, Western societies now would also require cultural citizenship to guarantee not only an egalitarian pattern of cultural participation, but also the competence to deal with cultural and ethnic diversity. See Van Gunsteren (ed.), *Eigentijds burgerschap*; Turner, 'Postmodern culture/modern citizens' and Isin and Nielsen, *Acts of Citizenship*.

Neither does Marshall's model reflect the development of citizenship in the United States. American citizenship continued to be centred on civil and political rights and duties. As far as an American conception of social citizenship exists at all, it focuses on obligations to the community rather than welfare entitlements, which are associated with charity and therefore remain largely outside the status of citizenship. The weakness of social citizenship in terms of welfare rights in the United States reflects the binary opposition between possessive individualism with its connotations of independence, rationality, self-interest, contract, equal exchange and mutual benefit versus charity associated with dependence, sentiment, altruism, inequality, unilateral gift-giving and getting something for nothing.[9]

Marshall's story is basically about liberation from oppression and the political struggles to obtain, extend and give substance to formal rights. However, as his critics point out, these rights have largely been articulated as passive entitlements while the other side of democratic citizenship, the will to participate actively in public life and take on social obligations, has been neglected. Marshall did not address questions about the relation between rights and duties and about the intrinsic quality of citizenship in terms of competence and responsibility.

The crisis of the welfare state prompted the neo-liberal attack on social citizenship, first in United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher and in the United States under Ronald Reagan, and later in other Western European countries. The economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s and the growing volume of beneficiaries undermined the solvency of the welfare state. In the decades that followed it became the object of recurrent political controversy. Critics asserted that the welfare state was dysfunctional, both in its economic and in its welfare effects. It was trapped in a cycle of rising expenditures and taxes, higher wage costs, an overloaded public sector, decreasing entrepreneurial incentives and economic investments, and an increasing exit rate from the labour force because of unemployment, early retirement and the massive application of employment disability regulations. Welfare provisions were not liberating, they added, but rather kept beneficiaries tied in dependence and strangled individual initiative and responsibility. Also, more and more citizens – calculatedly or not – were abusing the welfare system. The sense of civic responsibility necessary to sustain the welfare state appeared to be crumbling. At the same time poverty and social marginalisation had not disappeared. Quite the contrary: the welfare state had strongly contributed to the rise of a dependent underclass and social disorganisation. Such, in neo-liberal eyes, were the perverse effects of the rights-based, 'duty-free' practice of social citizenship that the welfare state had engendered.

Neo-liberals also challenged the legitimacy of state-guaranteed social rights on political philosophical grounds. State intervention in social-economic life, which entailed that governments embraced certain values regarding how people should organise their lives, was considered to be fundamentally at odds with the formal task of the state as a neutral arbitrator, guaranteeing that the law be upheld and civil and political rights secured. By blurring the boundaries between state, society, and the private sphere, the welfare state became an overloaded apparatus for satisfying an endless array of personal demands. Moreover, welfare from the cradle to the grave involved a state with

[9] N. Fraser and L. Gordon, 'Civil citizenship against social citizenship? On the ideology of contract versus-charity', in: Van Steenbergen (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship*, pp. 90-107, here pp. 101-5.

paternalistic dimensions. Increasing bureaucratic regulation and tutelage by the helping professions threatened basic civil liberties and impaired the vigour of the democratic order. The overemphasis on social rights not only resulted in dependency and demoralisation, but the transformation of citizens into demanding welfare clients undermined their democratic competence and responsibility as well.

Neo-conservatives and communitarians backed up the neo-liberal rejection of social citizenship. In their view, the extension of welfare benefits in combination with the 1960s liberation movement had bred selfish, irresponsible and consumerist individualism. The result was an erosion of social cohesion, public morality, and civil manners, while citizenship had degenerated into passivity: between elections, citizens had become spectators of rather than active participants in the democratic process. Moreover, democracy was undermined by declining political participation, growing voter-apathy, decreasing membership of political parties and social organisations, and growing ethnic and religious diversity. Similar concerns, which were increasingly shared by representatives of the political left, became even more pressing in connection with concern about the continued existence of a marginal 'underclass' which had grown and diversified as a result of mass immigration from the underdeveloped countries. Even in the welfare state many people were suffering from poverty, unemployment, bad health, and educational deprivation. Lacking autonomy, self-reliance and the social skills required for full participation in modern society, they could hardly be considered as full citizens. In addition feminists suggested that Marshall's concept of social citizenship still presumed a patriarchal approach to women. To a large extent, they argued, social security arrangements were geared to the traditional family: women, in their unpaid caring role of housewife and mother, depended on male wage-earners (or welfare recipients) and were thus designated a position as second-class citizens.

Criticism of Marshall's model was boosted by socio-economic and cultural changes in the Western world from the 1970s. The growing complexity, fragmentation and variability of post-modern society as a consequence of economic liberalisation and globalisation, the pluralisation of individual life-styles, and cultural and ethnic diversity, affected the transparency of society and the belief in social engineering, on which the welfare state was based. The post-war welfare state was built on a more or less socially integrated and culturally homogeneous nation state, which had a large degree of control over a largely nationally organised and industry-based economy. Further, the gender-division of labour between male breadwinners and female caretakers in the family was taken for granted. Economically, the emphasis shifted from the manufacturing industry to high technology, information, and services. Socially, alongside the traditional family, a plurality of alternative living arrangements evolved, which together with the ongoing process of individualisation and emancipation of women, resulted in stronger claims for economic independence of individuals. Globalisation and European integration as well mass immigration and increased ethnic and cultural pluralism affected the autonomy of and the loyalty to the nation and also the homogeneity of its culture. Cultural and religious heterogeneity have shaken the experience of shared citizenship.

In the 1980s and 1990s, a new ideal of citizenship was articulated in public debates by politicians as well as political and social scientists. This neo-republican model came down to a revitalisation of liberal-democratic citizenship by infusing it with elements of the older republican ideal of active citizenship. It implies that the resilience

of modern democracy depends on the attitudes of citizens, the mutual engagement of the state and its population, and the vigour of civil society. Shifting the emphasis from social rights and benefits to duties and responsibilities, the new ideal focuses on the intrinsic quality of the practice of citizenship. Under the banner of 'civic-mindedness' it refers to an ensemble of social abilities and public virtues: independence, self-control, reasonableness, open-mindedness, the capacity to discern and respect the rights and opinions of others, tolerance without being indifferent, social and political participation, and 'civil' behaviour in the public sphere.

To these virtues neo-liberal and communitarian merits were added. In the neo-liberal perspective, dominated by economic considerations and a strong belief in the benefits of a free market, citizens should be self-supportive and self-reliant, while the state should limit itself to facilitating private initiative, enterprise, labour force participation, and education. Communitarians deny that these neo-liberal tenets are sufficient for realising good citizenship. Rejecting naked self-interest and fearing social atomisation, they hold that individuals are dependent on historically grown communities sharing a common basis of togetherness and accountability. Apart from conservative norms and values such as law and order and the work and family ethic, they stress the significance of mutual assistance, community-spirit and care as civic virtues. Communitarianism is guided by the idea that the democratic public spirit can only be realised by active participation in civil society. While the role of the state is minimal in neo-liberal ideology, it is quite significant in the neo-republican and communitarian approach, making it acceptable to social democrats as well. The state should not just constrain the market and set the basic rules for civil society in order to prevent disproportional inequality and dependency. It should also create the preconditions for the development of active and competent citizenship, for example through teaching civic virtues and democratic values in schools, mandatory national service for youths, projects aimed at the cultural integration of ethnic minorities, and the advancement of responsible and healthy lifestyles. In most European countries, the basic tenet of the welfare state has (still) been preserved. Social solidarity is still connected to welfare benefits, even if they have been trimmed down and are balanced by more duties and obligations than before. The welfare state has embarked on a new course by replacing 'passive' social security rights with more participatory structures. Absorption into employment, the work ethic, flexibility and mobility in the labour market, continuing education, and the incentive to develop one's talents and abilities as well a one's health to their fullest extent, are key elements in new welfare regimes and the neo-republican ideal of citizenship.